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ABSTRACT 
This study evaluates Botswana’s prospects for democratic consolidation by 
investigating whether the country’s unique post-colonial experience of steady economic 
growth and multiparty democracy has promoted the growth of emancipative, ‘self-expression 
values.’ Firstly, the study measures the levels of emancipative, ‘self-expression’ values in the 
country, which are associated with mature democracies, and tests four predictive models 
linking development to individual-level cultural change: modernisation theory, the Human 
Development Sequence, a cognitive hypothesis, and a political learning approach. Secondly, 
it replicates the analysis for the full regional dataset in order to investigate the extent to which 
Africans’ values are shaped by collective experience.  
In contrast to expectations based on aggregate socioeconomic indicators, the results 
indicate that Botswana is at a middling point on the survival/self-expression value spectrum 
and that citizens are not, on average, significantly more self-expressive than their regional 
counterparts. Further analysis indicates that cultural variation within the country was driven 
by differences in levels of both existen ial security and cognitive autonomy. Regional growth 
of self-expression values, conversely, was primarily shaped by individual cognitive forces, 
rather than generational or collective experiences.  
Overall, the study’s results indicate that the pace and state-driven nature of 
Botswana’s post-colonial development has produced similar challenges to those faced by 
other Sub-Saharan African countries. Botswana’s prospects for future democratic 
consolidation are therefore contingent not only on the continued growth of an educated, 
professional middle class, but also on the development of a vibrant private sector to decrease 
ordinary citizens’ reliance on the state.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
vi 
 
“We were taught, sometimes in a very positive way, to despise ourselves and our ways of life. 
We were made to believe that we had no past to speak of, no history to boast of. The past, so 
far as we were concerned, was just a blank and nothing more. Only the present mattered and 
we had very little control over it. It seemed we were in for a definite period of foreign 
tutelage, without any hope of our ever again becoming our own masters. The end result of all 
this was that our self-pride and our self-confidence were badly undermined. 
 
It should now be our intention to try to retrieve what we can of our past. We should write our 
own history books to prove that we did have a past, and that it was a past that was just as 
worth writing and learning about as any other. We must do this for the simple reason that a 
nation without a past is a lost nation, and a people without a past is a people without a soul.” 
- Sir Seretse Khama, speech of Chancellor at University of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland graduation ceremony, 15 May 1970 (Source: Botswana Daily News, 19 May 
1970, supplement). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Botswana is widely regarded to be one of the world’s most successful ‘development 
states’ following its transformation from a poor colonial outpost into a wealthy, peaceful 
democracy on a continent that remains better known for extreme poverty, brutal civil conflict 
and despotic leaders. Despite the country’s extensive socioeconomic changes, much of the 
current research on democracy in Botswana focuses on the continuity of indigenous traditions 
in the contemporary political landscape. This study takes the contrasting approach and aims 
to measure the cultural impact of these shifts. Although analysts increasingly question 
Botswana’s reputation as an African ‘miracle,’ the nation’s development trajectory is 
undoubtedly unique due to the scale, pace, and endurance of this success. By focusing on 
ordinary citizens, rather than political institutions or elites, my analysis attempts to evaluate 
the extent to which Botswana’s distinct post-colonial trajectory distinguishes Batswana 
(citizens of Botswana) from other Africans. In this chapter, I outline Botswana’s 
transformation and the current understanding of its relationship with the national political 
culture, before summarising the global evidence linking sustained development to democratic 
consolidation and the theoretical framework with which I will approach my research 
questions.  
A Nation in Flux: Botswana’s Development, 1966-2012 
Much of the current interest in Botswana’s development is due to the country’s 
impressive record of political and economic stability. Botswana is Africa’s oldest democracy 
and has enjoyed decades of uninterrupted multiparty democracy, with ten free and fair 
elections and a range of positive governance indicators and political freedoms.1 Conventional 
wisdom attributes this concurrent economic and political progress to the ‘exceptional’ 
                                                 
1 Mauritius held its first elections under universal suffrage in 1959, but only gained independence in 1968. 
Botswana, on the other hand, held its founding elections in 1965 and gained independence the following year. 
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 2 
combination of visionary leadership with the natural advantages of a small, homogenous 
population and significant mineral deposits (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly & Levine, 
1997; Samatar, 1999; and Sebudubudu & Molutsi, 2011). As the continent is generally 
abundant in resources and new empirical evidence disputes the longstanding perception of 
ethnic homogeneity, recent studies increasingly emphasise the role of good governance in 
sustaining the country’s economic success (e.g. Robinson & Parsons, 2006).  Prudent 
stewardship of the country’s diamond resources fuelled Botswana’s ‘growth miracle,’ which 
transformed the country from one of the poorest in the world into an upper-middle-income 
economy within the space of a single generation (Figure A.1).2 As a result, living standards 
have steadily improved over time and national human development indictors are substantially 
higher than the regional average (Figure A.2). The Central Statistics Office (CSO) reports 
that most Batswana have access to fundamental services such as potable water (95%) and 
basic sanitation (80%), while 84% of the population lives within five kilometres of a public 
health facility (CSO & UNICEF, 2009: 4; CSO, 2007: 1). 
The first major consequence of this development is the shift away from agriculture 
towards an increasingly industrialised and globalised economy. Although diamonds remain 
Botswana’s primary export, government policies prioritise economic diversification and the 
national workforce is concentrated in the service sector (Table A.1). Secondly, Botswana has 
experienced a dramatic decline in the national fertility rate since independence, which has 
consequently reduced the proportion of the dependent population relative to the labour force 
(i.e. ‘dependency ratio’; Table A.2). This is a common feature of modernising societies and 
was previously found to promote further economic development in South East Asia during 
the 1990s (Nair, 2010).  
                                                 
2
 The World Bank currently classifies economies by their 2011 GNI per capita levels (Atlas method): ‘low 
income,’ $1,025 or less; ‘lower middle income,’ $1,026-$4,035; ‘upper middle income,’ $4,036-$12,475; and 
‘high income,’ at least $12,476 (World Bank, 2012b). Botswana graduated to its current status in 1993. 
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 3 
Thirdly, there has been a sizeable change in women’s roles in the family and wider 
community: Batswana women now represent almost half (48%) of the country’s formal 
employment and younger generations of women are more literate than their male 
counterparts (Table A.3).3 In general, Botswana performs well in terms of assuring equal 
educational attainment and economic opportunity, but continues to lag in women’s health and 
political empowerment indicators (World Economic Forum, 2011). Fourthly, the proportion 
of urban residents has soared from 5% in 1966 to almost two-thirds (61%) of the national 
population in 2010 (Figure A.3). This shift has transformed the communities in which 
Batswana live from the traditional support systems of large extended families and small, rural 
communities towards progressively smaller households in large, urban areas.  
Although all of these processes are common occurrences in modernising societies, the 
national government has warned of a growing identity crisis among young Batswana—
blaming changes in traditional family and communal life, in addition to external influences 
from the international media (Ministry of Labour & Home Affairs, 1996).4 This anxiety 
reflects the prevailing perception that ‘modern’ values are antithetical to Botswana’s identity 
as a traditional, conservative society. Since independence, the country’s political elites have 
sought to promote economic development and democratisation, while simultaneously 
honouring the country’s past and preserving traditional Tswana morals (cf. opening quote: vi). 
This goal has become increasingly difficult to achieve, however, because of the tremendous 
pace of social transformation since the 1970s. Given these changes, theories of modernisation 
would predict that cultural change is both inevitable and irreversible. Furthermore, they 
                                                 
3
 The Botswana Family Health Survey found that half (53%) of Batswana women practiced some form of birth 
control in 2007-2008 (CSO & UNICEF, 2009). 
4
 The policy document also acknowledges the role of long-standing problems such as income inequality, 
disproportionate unemployment levels (Table A.4), and limited educational opportunities in precipitating 
crime and violence amongst the youth (MLHA, 1996: 7).  
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 4 
would argue that this change is desirable, as it would provide the requisite conditions for 
further political development and, ultimately, democratic consolidation.5  
In particular, Ronald Inglehart’s intergenerational value change thesis would predict 
that the type of rapid modernisation that Botswana has experienced would mean that 
successive generations of Batswana will progressively shift away from traditional, communal 
values towards those prioritising individualism and self-expression. My question, thus, is has 
Botswana’s experience of steady economic growth and multiparty democracy in fact 
promoted the growth of these emancipative, ‘self-expression values’?  
Political Attitudes in Botswana 
Despite the general interest in Botswana’s unique development trajectory, this study 
appears to be the first empirical investigation of the relationship between socioeconomic 
growth and cultural change in the country. Due to the lack of general lack of survey data in 
the country, the current understanding of the national political culture is based on 
extrapolations from small-scale empirical studies of citizenship norms (e.g. Preece & 
Mosweunyane, 2004) and descriptive statistics of attitudinal and behavioural data.6 Historical 
accounts of Botswana’s emergence as an independent state demonstrate that state-building 
efforts heavily involved local elites prior to independence—in contrast to most African 
nations (Robinson & Parsons, 2006). As Botswana’s political development has primarily been 
a ‘top-down’ process ever since, empirical studies tend to concentrate on either 
institutionalisation or political elites (e.g. Molomo, 2005; Good, 2008; Sebudubudu & 
Molutsi, 2011).  
                                                 
5
  Linz and Stepan (1996) defines a ‘consolidated’ democracy as “a political regime in which democracy as a 
complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the 
only game in town’” (15). 
6
 Preece and Mosweunyane’s evidence was collected between 2002 and 2003, and includes ninety-eight 
participants; of whom seven were political leaders while the rest were young Batswana. The study primarily 
recruited its respondents via civic associations, therefore its participants are likely unrepresentative of the 
general population (Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004). 
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Analysts agree that the country’s conscious blend of indigenous and ‘imported’ 
political structures has resulted in its remarkable stability (e.g. Lekorwe et al., 2001), but the 
country’s development appears to be stagnating as a result. A comparative study of 
democracies in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) found that 
“compared to the recent progress made by other countries in the region, Botswana’s 
democracy does not stand out as more progressive or comprehensively developed” overall, 
despite its longevity (Molutsi, 2005: 26). One of the areas of weaknesses identified in 
Molutsi (2005) is persistent voter apathy, which the author interprets as indication of weak 
public confidence in the democratic system (cf. Democracy Research Project, 2002; Table 
A.4). Maundeni (2005) argues that the preservation of automatic succession procedures from 
the pre-colonial era excludes ordinary Batswana from the decision-making process when 
selecting national leaders. This may explain why the country has generally failed to develop a 
participative political culture. In addition to weak electoral turnout, Molomo (2006) found 
that, on average, only 12% of citizens were active members of a civic organisation (including 
religious associations) in 2005. Furthermore, the country’s youth demonstrate similar 
behavioural patterns to preceding generations—despite being more educated and familiar 
with civic duties, and growing up in an increasingly prosperous climate (Ntsabane, 2005). 
Ntsabane and Ntau (2000) attribute young Batswana’s voter apathy to the perpetuation of 
traditional, ‘authoritarian’ norms in family life and schools.  
These findings suggests that Botswana’s post-independence experience has had 
limited, if any, impact on the country’s political culture despite its on-going modernisation 
and globalisation. The existing attitudinal analyses consequently focus on continuity with the 
country’s past and none have systematically related Batswana’s beliefs to the country’s more 
recent, post-colonial development.  
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According to Preece and Mosweunyane (2004), citizenship in the country is based on 
conservative communal norms, which focus on micro-level communities and are generally 
depoliticised. These values emphasise volunteerism, self-help and deference to community 
needs, and hold citizens subject to customary law and traditional authorities (Preece & 
Mosweunyane, 2004: 5). This suggests that Batswana’s values are not significantly different 
from those of other Africans. In fact, scholars generally agree that African societies, although 
diverse, share a set of common cultural attributes due to the legacy of traditional norms and 
behaviours (Mattes & Shin, 2005).7 Moreover, there is consensus that the defining feature of 
African culture is these societies’ is an emphasis on communal needs over individualism, 
which is believed to impede the transition from deferent, colonial subjects to active 
citizenship (Mamdani, 1996; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000). The emphasis on communal values 
based on localised identities remains prevalent across much of the continent, as the traditional 
experience of life in small-scale, rural villages and patriarchal, hereditary leadership 
continues to be a reality for a large proportion of Africans (Ake, 1991).  
Botswana’s demographic indicators, however, clearly demonstrate that this experience 
is no longer applicable to a growing proportion of Batswana, which should therefore 
distinguish their political values from those of other Africans. The Afrobarometer surveys 
have, in fact, found that Batswana consistently exhibit amongst of the highest levels of 
support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, which suggests that the country’s unique 
experience has had a significant cultural impact after all (Afrobarometer, 2009a). Lekorwe et 
al. (2001) found that there was a high level of trust in political institutions in Botswana and 
that the majority of respondents were aware of their civic rights and responsibilities. Overall, 
a strong majority of Batswana (76%) preferred democracy to alternative regimes and 79% 
                                                 
7
 Etounga-Manguelle (2000: 75) proposes the following characteristics in his ‘typology’ of African culture: 
rigid, social hierarchy; weak controls over uncertainty; space and time perceived as a single entity; indivisible 
power and authority for political elites; avoidance of open conflict; inefficiency; irrationalism; and, above all, 
communal domination over the individual. 
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 7 
were either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ satisfied with its implementation in the country between 1999 
and 2008 (Afrobarometer, 2009c). Further analysis of these attitudes consequently suggests 
that Botswana has the best prospects for democratic consolidation in the Afrobarometer’s 
sample of Sub-Saharan African countries (Afrobarometer, 2009b).8  
In sum, a survey of the current literature indicates that no one has directly addressed 
the relationship between development and political culture in Botswana. Instead, most 
analyses focus on the role of institutions and elites in the country’s democratisation, while 
existing national analyses of public attitudes focus on cultural continuity, rather than 
change—yet regional evidence from the Afrobarometer surveys indicates that the country’s 
political culture is distinct from those in other African societies. Bratton et al. (2005) 
consequently argues that Botswana’s post-colonial trajectory has improved the likelihood that 
its democracy will consolidate. In the following section, I outline evidence from other 
societies that suggests that modernisation precipitates significant cultural changes that are 
associated with democratisation. 
Socioeconomic Development and Global Cultural Change 
Lipset (1959) found that industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth, formal education, and 
regime legitimacy were all strongly associated with effective and enduring democracies; 
subsequently arguing that successful democratisation requires these ‘social requisites.’ This 
study became the foundational text of modernisation theory, which posits that economic 
growth precipitates a series of technological (industrialisation), organisational (specialisation) 
and attitudinal (rationalisation) changes that collectively comprise the ‘modernisation’ 
process.9 Modernisation theory became the leading paradigm in comparative politics in the 
                                                 
8
  Botswana had the highest prospects for democratic consolidation in 1999/2000, with an aggregate score of 96 
on the Afrobarometer’s ‘Prospects for the Consolidation of Democracy’ index. The country was followed by: 
Malawi (76); Zambia (74); Nigeria (72); Tanzania (70); Ghana (68); Uganda (52); Mali (50); South Africa 
(38); Namibia (32); Lesotho (12); and, lastly, Zimbabwe (6; Bratton et al., 2005: 328, Table 13.2). 
9 Daniel Bell (1960) lists these changes as: Weberian bureaucratisation; the development of a welfare state; 
occupational specialisation; rising education levels; rising living standards, longevity and leisure time; greater 
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 8 
1950s and 1960s because it provided analysts with a single explanatory framework with 
which to assess both developed and emerging nations. Most emerging nations lacked the 
conditions identified in Lipset (1959), therefore social scientists questioned the prospects of 
democratisation in the Sub-Saharan Africa barring future economic and demographic 
transformation.  
Despite its foundation in empirical evidence, modernisation theory was discredited 
due to its inability to predict outcomes in emerging nations in subsequent decades (cf. 
Huntington, 1965). Early studies (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Rustow, 1960) were based on data 
limited to the existing states of the time—giving established, Western nations a 
disproportionate influence on these findings. Modernisation theory consequently presumed 
that tradition and modernity are mutually exclusive, and that all societies would inevitably 
follow the path Great Britain established during the Industrial Revolution. The post-colonial 
era demonstrated that the modernisation process could be both an opportunity and a threat to 
political development—particularly in developing countries, whose rapid transformations 
forced governments to simultaneously lead development efforts while absorbing the process’ 
undesired effects (Bill & Hardgrave, 1981). Contemporary studies of the relationship 
between economic development and democracy have since evolved towards a focus on 
citizens’ commitment to democracy, rather the abandonment of traditional values, when 
examining political culture (Hagopian, 2000). 
One notable example of these updated versions of modernisation theory is Inglehart’s 
intergenerational value thesis, which reconceptualises modernisation as two distinct 
processes: industrialisation and post-industrialisation. According to Inglehart’s thesis, as an 
economy shifts away from agriculture towards the industrial sector (i.e. ‘industrialisation’), 
citizens shift from an emphasis on traditional (religious) to rational-legal (government) 
                                                                                                                                                       
availability of mass media; the decline of landed elites in favour of the urban bourgeoisie; urbanisation; 
increasing emphasis on the nuclear, rather than extended, family; and women’s entry into the work force (cited 
in Norris, 2002: 22). 
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 9 
sources of authority. Furthermore, the shift away from an industrial economy towards the 
service sector (‘post-industrialisation’) leads to a second cultural shift towards an emphasis of 
individual self-expression over all forms of authority (Inglehart, 1999; Table A.6). Societal 
value change therefore occurs gradually as successive generations grow up under 
increasingly secure material conditions.  
The Human Development Sequence (HDS) theory expands the intergenerational 
value change thesis to include institutional change by arguing that socioeconomic growth is 
linked to democratic consolidation via the growth of emancipative, ‘post-modern’ values 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). The theory therefore combines socioeconomic, cultural, and 
institutional change within a single explanatory model under the overarching concept of 
‘human development.’ This concept is founded on Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s 
revolutionary reconceptualisation of ‘development’ as “a process of expanding the real 
freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999: 3). As Table 1.1 (below) demonstrates, these 
emancipative, ‘self-expression values’ provide the motive to exercise individual autonomy, 
while economic growth provides the means and democracy the institutional framework with 
which to do so (Welzel et al., 2003).  
Table 1.1: The Process of Human Development  
Human Development 
 Socioeconomic Dimension Cultural Dimension Institutional Dimension 
Process Modernisation Value change Democratisation 
Component Socioeconomic resources Self-expression values Civil and political liberties 
Contribution 
Enhancing people’s capabilities 
to act according to their choices 
Increasing people’s priority to 
act according to their choices 
Broadening people’s 
entitlements to act according to 
their choices 
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 3). 
The HDS theory is corroborated by cross-national evidence from the World Values 
Survey (WVS), which suggests that that socioeconomic growth tends to result in robust 
intergenerational differences in citizens’ political values—depending on each country’s 
development level (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994; cf. Figures A.4 and A.5). Citizens in 
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 10 
prosperous, post-industrial societies appear to have largely shifted away from communal 
(‘survival’) values towards an emphasis on individualism and self-expression, while this 
transformation occurs more slowly (if at all) in low-income countries (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005b). As a result, there is a growing cultural gap between countries of differing 
development levels, which is strongly correlated with the global variation across several 
democratic indicators (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). The WVS data consequently suggests that 
socioeconomic development creates an attitudinal environment conducive to the 
establishment and stability of liberal democracy.  
Both the HDS and modernisation theories would predict that Botswana’s 
socioeconomic growth is leading to a cultural shift towards emancipative, post-modern 
values. However, the HDS would emphasise citizens’ levels of subjective existential security 
over modernisation theory’s focus on objective indicators such as urbanisation, 
professionalisation, industrialisation and service sector employment. 
A third interpretation of the link between socioeconomic growth and pro-democratic 
culture privileges the role of formal education in democratisation. Democracy research has 
consistently corroborated Lipset’s finding that there is a positive association between an 
educated population and democratisation (Diamond, 2001). However, Blais (2007) highlights 
the need to distinguish between the cognitive and cultural effects of formal education: 
schooling may increase political comprehension, rather than promote pro-democratic 
attitudes. Despite this caveat, evidence from established democracies suggests that citizens 
with tertiary education are more likely to support ‘engaged’ citizenship norms, which 
encompass a broader range of political engagement than traditional ‘citizen duty’ norms and 
are comparable to Inglehart’s concept of ‘self-expression values’ (Dalton, 2009).10 Given 
                                                 
10
  Dalton (2009) contrasted citizenship norms in: Australia; Austria; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; 
Germany (East and West); Great Britain; Ireland; Japan; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; 
Sweden; and Switzerland. 
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 11 
Batswana’s rising education levels since independence, this theory would also predict that the 
country’s political culture is shifting towards an emphasis on emancipative citizenship norms. 
The final explanation that I will address shifts away from socioeconomic legacies 
altogether towards the political realm. In contrast to global tends, Afrobarometer evidence 
suggests that individual-level variables and post-colonial political, rather than not economic, 
paths shape citizens’ attitudes towards democracy (Bratton et al., 2005). These findings 
suggest that political attitudes on the continent are the result of ‘learning’ about democracy 
via a combination of cognitive and experiential factors—not the result of structural factors or 
traditional values (Mattes and Bratton, 2007). Given Botswana’s stable post-independence 
political development, this argument would predict that the country should be experiencing a 
shift towards pro-democratic, emancipative values as citizens become increasingly socialised 
by the living in a relatively effective and well-functioning democracy. 
Research Questions 
Firstly, do socioeconomic differences have a significant effect on citizens’ political 
values? This question addresses the uneven nature of the country’s economic development, as 
poverty and inequality remain significant challenges despite overall growth. Secondly, do 
Batswana’s values form based on individual or collective, generational experience? This 
question addresses the pace of economic development, which has led to divergences in 
individual experience. Thirdly, does formal education have a significant effect on Batswana’s 
political values? This addresses one of the major consequences of Botswana’s development. 
Fourthly, has Botswana’s sustained experience of electoral democracy had a significant 
impact on its political culture? This question addresses the extent to which direct experience 
of multiparty democracy is further conducive to consolidation—thereby establishing a 
virtuous circle of political development.  
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Relevance of Study 
Botswana’s economic development has led to a range of socioeconomic changes; 
including rising levels of material security and a generation of youth that is better educated 
and connected to international influences than its predecessors. Furthermore, the nation’s 
political development has resulted in an enduring multiparty democracy. Botswana 
consequently presents a compelling case for the study of the link between previous 
development and current political culture. The scale and longevity of the country’s 
socioeconomic success, coupled with its decades of stable multiparty democracy, would 
appear to provide unique conditions for the growth of democratic values in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Despite these factors, the WVS dataset includes a limited number of African cases 
and has never included Botswana.  
This thesis will attempt to use African survey data to measure and analyse the 
formation of ‘self-expression values’ in both Botswana and seventeen other Sub-Saharan 
African countries. By doing so, the study will test whether Batswana are significantly 
different from other Africans, given the nation’s comparative success and prior evidence that 
it was the most likely to achieve democratic consolidation. Do Batswana vary internally, and 
in contrast to other Africans, in ways that would be predicted by its past four decades of 
economic and political progress? If I find that there is indeed evidence, this may suggest a 
path for other countries in the region. Furthermore, extending my analysis to the cross-
national level allows me to test whether self-expression values are primarily influenced by 
individual characteristics (i.e. perceived security and cognition), or collective experiences 
(overall national development). Lastly, although the HDS theory is based on compelling 
cross-national and longitudinal evidence, this study is the first to specifically test its 
applicability in the region.   
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
Following decades of diamond-fuelled growth, Botswana is virtually unrecognisable 
from the poor, agricultural and illiterate society of 1966. Rapid urbanisation, industrialisation 
and globalisation have transformed the communities in which Batswana live, while 
democratisation has transformed them from colonial subjects to legal citizens. The breadth 
and pace of these changes make Botswana a unique setting for the study of human 
development, yet relatively little is known about the cultural impact of the country’s 
development trajectory. It is therefore unclear whether the country’s political culture is 
shifting towards the emphasis on individual freedom and self-expression that is associated 
with advanced, post-industrial democracies. This chapter outlines how I adapt the Human 
Development Sequence (HDS) theory’s concepts and measures to the available data from the 
Afrobarometer, in order to investigate whether Botswana lives up to its reputation as an 
‘exceptional’ African democracy.  
Conceptual Framework 
Maslow (1943) posits that all human action is determined by a hierarchy of five basic, 
universal motivations—of which physical survival is the most primal (Figure A.4).11 As a 
result, people only allocate their resources to higher-order, psychological needs once they 
meet their physiological and safety needs. The HDS theory reorganises Maslow’s hierarchy 
into a value spectrum with two diametrically opposed clusters of preferences on either end: 
the first (‘survival values’) emphasises extrinsic, physical priorities, while the second (‘self-
expression values’) prioritises intrinsic, psychological motivations (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005b: 138). If this theory applies in Botswana, I should find that: socioeconomic factors, 
rather than political, explain how Batswana’s value preferences form; existential security is a 
                                                 
11  The author defines the ultimate motivation, ‘self-actualisation,’ as “the desire to become more and more what 
one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming” (Maslow, 1943: 383).   
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better predictor of self-expression values than cognition and living in a ‘modern’ or 
democratic environment; and that citizens’ values form via generational learning. 
Development and Value Change 
The HDS theory predicts that self-expression values form via a logic of ‘economic 
socialisation.’ Firstly, the scarcity hypothesis posits that an individual’s cultural priorities 
depend on his or her sense of existential security (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 97). Under 
insecure conditions, physical survival takes priority and individuals prioritise survival values. 
Under secure conditions, however, people prioritise self-expressive values because they have 
fewer external constraints to their choices (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 138).
12
 The 
socialisation hypothesis further argues that cultural values are largely formed prior to 
adulthood. As a result, prolonged periods of economic growth lead to a societal shift from 
survival to self-expression values, while long-term economic reversals lead to the opposite, 
via generational replacement (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 97-99). Generations that grow up 
under high levels of subjective material security should therefore be more likely to hold self-
expression values. 
Figure 2.1: Socioeconomic Growth and Value Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first alternative explanation, a theory of ‘cognitive learning’, asserts that 
emancipative attitudes are primarily determined by an individual’s abilities—particularly the 
                                                 
12
  The study will therefore alternately refer to self-expression values as ‘emancipative’ norms due to this 
association with human autonomy.  
Cognitive 
Theory 
Cognitive 
Autonomy 
Modernisation 
Theory 
Urbanisation & 
Industrialisation 
Logic Predictor Variable Outcome Variable 
Socioeconomic 
Growth 
Self-Expression 
Values  
HDS 
Theory 
Existential 
Security 
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ability to form independent beliefs and evaluations (i.e. ‘cognitive autonomy’). This 
emphasis on cognition disputes the HDS’ emphasis on experiential factors, arguing instead 
that citizens who have tertiary education are significantly more likely to hold self-expressive 
value preferences than the rest of the population due to their greater cognitive autonomy. 
Opinion data from established democracies indicates that higher education is a more 
significant indicator of ‘engaged citizenship norms,’ than traditional, duty-based forms of 
citizenship (Dalton, 2009). Individuals who have high levels of cognitive autonomy should 
therefore be more likely to hold self-expression values. 
The third possible explanation, modernisation theory, asserts that economic 
development leads to key ‘social requisites’ of successful democratisation: industrialisation, 
wealth, urbanisation, and education (Lipset, 1959). As an economy shifts away from the 
agrarian sector, citizens tend to move to urban environments and work in specialised 
occupations—leading to an urban, professional middle-class. As both the HDS and cognitive 
theories incorporate wealth and education, I will address the effects of industrialisation and 
urbanisation under the banner of ‘modernisation.’ Moreover, I emphasise the role of working 
in the service industry in forming these values due to the argument that self-expression values 
are predominant in post-industrial society (Inglehart, 1997). One should find that urban and 
professional, ‘white collar’ environments are conducive to forming self-expression values. 
Figure 2.2: Political Development and Value Change 
 
As Figure 2.2 (above) indicates, the final explanation shifts away from 
socioeconomic legacies and asserts direct experience of multiparty democracy forms self-
expression values via political socialisation. This theory therefore agrees with the HDS’ 
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assertion that experiential factors shape individuals’ values, but disputes the assumption that 
the causal direction in human development is from economic (modernisation) to cultural 
(survival to self-expression values), and ultimately, political (democratisation) change. 
Lindberg (2006), for example, found that electoral experience—even when flawed—made a 
positive impact on ‘human freedom’ and democratic attitudes in much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Furthermore, Bratton et al. (2005) found that countries who experienced more years 
under multiparty democracy than autocratic regimes in the post-colonial era had the most 
pro-democratic citizens. Individuals living in a multiparty democracy should therefore be 
more likely to embrace emancipative values. 
Modes of Political Learning 
As the previous section demonstrates, the relationship between development and 
value formation is multi-causal and the conceptual framework indicates that my analysis also 
needs to address the mode in which values form. The HDS theory is based on Inglehart’s 
intergenerational value change thesis, which predicts that aggregate cultural transformation 
occurs gradually via intergenerational population replacement; therefore generations who 
grow up during long periods of scarce conditions prioritise survival values, while those who 
do so under prosperity emphasise self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). On the 
other hand, the cognitive learning theory clearly implies that values are formed on an 
individual basis as the process depends on each citizen’s respective cognition. Furthermore, 
modernisation theory’s logic would predict that individuals who live in urban environments 
and work in ‘white-collar’ occupations are significantly different from those who do not.  
The final argument (political learning) is more ambiguous, however, and it is unclear 
whether political socialisation occurs on a generational or collective (i.e. national) basis. The 
first possibility is that the political learning model captures a process of political 
socialisation: generations who grow up in a multiparty democracy are more likely to be self-
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expressive because of their familiarity with democratic institutions and procedures. The 
second possibility is that self-expression values are the result of citizens’ environment and 
thus that all citizens within that environment form similar values. Individuals who grew up in 
autocratic regimes but spent their adulthoods in a democracy would therefore be as likely to 
embrace emancipative norms as younger citizens—as long as they had experienced an equal 
number of total years under multiparty democracy. Evidence from the Afrobarometer, for 
example, demonstrates that Africans’ attitudes towards democracy are shaped by their 
knowledge and experience of democracy well into adulthood (Bratton et al., 2005). 
Table 2.1: Competing Models of Value Formation. 
Model Predictor Variables Hypothesis 
Modernisation Theory 
‘Modern’ Environment: 
 Employment in services 
 Urban residential location 
Living and working in a ‘modern’ social 
environment promotes self-expression 
values. 
Human Development 
Sequence (HDS) 
  
Existential Security: 
 Economic Security 
 Physical Security 
 Job Security 
 Age Cohort 
Growing up in more prosperous 
conditions promotes self-expression 
values. 
Cognitive Learning  
Cognitive Autonomy: 
 Formal Education 
 Interest in Politics 
 Discusses Politics 
High levels of cognition promote self-
expression values. 
Political Learning  
Age cohort. 
Democratic Experience: 
 National Experience (years). 
 Liberal Democracy (FH score). 
Growing up/living in a multiparty 
democracy promotes self-expression 
values. 
Argument 
Botswana is an industrialising society and is therefore unlikely to have a similar level 
of self-expression values as established, post-industrial democracies. It is difficult, however, 
to predict where the country is on Inglehart’s survival/self-expression values scale because of 
the complex relationship between socioeconomic development and cultural values. A 
comparison of medium development nations surveyed in the fourth and fifth WVS waves 
demonstrates that there was a wide range in scores from the most (El Salvador) to least 
(Maldova) self-expressive society (Table A.7).  Furthermore, there is no immediate, clear 
relationship between these countries’ values and their 2011 Human Development Index 
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(HDI) and national income (GNI per capita) levels.
13
 Contrary to Inglehart and Welzel’s 
2005 prediction, this study expects to find that, on average, Batswana hold modest levels of 
self-expression values.
14
 While Botswana’s human development levels are not significantly 
higher than those South Africa and Guatemala, and are lower than the Philippines’, the 
country has had a long history of democratic stability—in addition to its socioeconomic 
success. Furthermore, I expect to find that there is systematic variation in citizens’ values 
based on the aforementioned conceptual framework.  
Firstly, I expect to find significant cultural differences between individual Batswana 
of varying socioeconomic backgrounds due to the country’s persistent income inequality: 
more secure citizens emphasise self-expression values, while less secure citizens prioritise 
survival values. Moreover, I expect to find modest generational differences in value 
preferences because of the country’s developmental pace. Although younger Batswana live in 
considerably more secure conditions than their predecessors, older citizens presumably 
continue to transmit their own (survival) values, which would moderate the economic boom’s 
cultural impact. My second hypothesis is consequently that the youngest generation of 
Batswana are significantly more self-expressive than the rest of the population. 
Third, I expect to find a positive relation between citizens’ cognitive autonomy and 
emancipative priorities in Botswana, but anticipate that existential security will make a 
greater impact on these values. Although the national government has heavily invested in 
education since independence, the public primary and secondary education system has been 
heavily criticised for failing to promote pro-democratic norms due to its traditional, 
                                                 
13
 It is appropriate to compare the two waves and to use 2011 indicators because aggregate values change very 
gradually (cf. socialisation hypothesis). 
14
 The authors’ model predicted that Botswana would have had a score of -0.20 on the survival/self-expression 
values scale, based on its economic indicators (GNP/capita, percentage of tertiary sector employment and 
number of years under communist rule) and location in Sub-Saharan Africa (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a: 191). 
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authoritarian nature, while access to tertiary education remains restricted by structural 
barriers (Ntsabane, 2005).
15
  
My fourth hypothesis is that individuals who live in urban environments are more 
likely to hold self-expressive preferences than their rural counterparts. My fifth is that there is 
a positive correlation between working in a white-collar occupation and self-expression 
values. Finally, Table A.8 indicates that the highest score recorded so far in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is Nigeria’s 2000 score (0.28), but I expect to find that a higher proportion of 
Batswana hold emancipative values than in other Sub-Saharan African countries. Botswana’s 
objective measures indicate that the country has outpaced its regional counterparts in almost 
all the predictor variables in my analysis (Table A.9). Furthermore, longitudinal opinion data 
indicate that Batswana have gradually deepened their support for democracy and remains the 
closest country to achieving democratic consolidation (Afrobarometer, 2009a).
16
  
Research Design 
As Botswana is not included in the WVS, this thesis will test these hypotheses by 
employing public opinion data from the Afrobarometer study. The Afrobarometer is a cross-
national survey of public attitudes in twenty Sub-Saharan African countries (as of Round 4), 
which asks questions and measures concepts that parallel most of the relevant concepts and 
variables employed in the HDS—thereby allowing for comparison across the two datasets. At 
present, the survey is the only source of recent, nationally representative data on public 
opinion in Botswana and has measured aggregate opinion over time in four rounds (1999-
2008). Given the socialisation hypothesis, the Afrobarometer’s timeframe is too short to 
capture cultural change over longitudinal analysis, thus a cross-sectional design is more 
                                                 
15
 Secondary education is divided into junior (3 years) and senior (2 years) level; there are 207 junior schools, 
but only 28 senior schools, in the country (Ministry of Education, 2010).  
16
 In 2008, 65% of respondents supported democracy and rejected all three autocratic alternative regimes, while 
80% believed the country was a democracy and were at least ‘fairly satisfied’ with the regime (Afrobarometer, 
2009c: 2). 
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appropriate. This study will employ data from Round Three (2005/2006), which best fits the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of self-expression values.  
Self-Expression Values in Botswana 
For its national analysis, this thesis’ population is voting-age Batswana (citizens of at 
least eighteen years old), represented by a sample of 1,200 respondents; I therefore employ 
micro-level analysis (individual respondent) to test my hypotheses. In Chapter Three, I 
attempt to measure levels of self-expression values in Botswana as of 2005 by creating a 
proxy based on the Afrobarometer questionnaire. Moreover, I test my index’s construct 
validity via reliability testing (Cronbach’s alpha) and factor analysis techniques (maximum-
likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation) on the overall population. Although this 
study tests the HDS model, a confirmatory factor analysis was not conducted because the 
analysis employs a different dataset from Inglehart’s original analysis. By doing so, I address 
critiques of Inglehart’s conceptualisation and operationalisation of self-expression values 
(e.g. Davis & Davenport, 1999; Haller, 2002; Seligson, 2002). In Chapter Four, I then 
employ various tests to test how self-expression values form in Botswana: firstly, I use 
bivariate correlation and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test each predictor 
variable separately; then, I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to evaluate the 
hypotheses simultaneously.  
Botswana in Comparative Perspective 
The study’s cross-national analysis employs a total sample of 25,395 voting-age 
respondents to represent the citizens of the eighteen countries included in the 2005 round.
17
 I 
therefore place Botswana in comparative context in Chapter Five by contrasting its aggregate 
score (computed as the arithmetic mean on the outcome variable’s scale) to those for the rest 
                                                 
17
 Frequencies were conducted on the weighted sample of 21,600 respondents (1,200 per country), while the 
explanatory analysis was conducted on the unweighted sample. Due to inconsistencies within the 
questionnaires, two countries (Cape Verde and Zimbabwe) were excluded from the explanatory analysis, thus 
reducing the unweighted sample’s size to 22,093 respondents. 
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of the Afrobarometer sample. In the first regression models, I employ micro-level analysis to 
evaluate how individual citizens’ values formed. Afterwards, I aggregate my findings to the 
national level (i.e. N=17) to further test my hypotheses using objective data.
18
 By placing 
Botswana in the regional context and thus extending beyond a single-country study, I test the 
extent to which my index is equivalent to Inglehart’s original self-expression values measure 
and evaluate whether the country is an outlier.  
Measurement 
My outcome variable is the concept of ‘self-expression values,’ which represents “a 
syndrome of mass attitudes that tap a common underlying dimension that incorporates an 
emphasis on freedom, tolerance of diversity, and political participation, at both the individual 
and aggregate levels” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003: 64). Inglehart’s operationalisation captures 
both poles of this value dimension and has gradually evolved from using numerous variables 
in Inglehart (1997; Table A.10) to only five survey items in Inglehart & Welzel (2005b; 
Table A.11). Self-expression values therefore reflect five cultural characteristics, or 
‘indicators’: post-materialist values; high levels of subjective wellbeing; social tolerance; 
political activism; and high interpersonal trust. Survival values, on the other hand, represent 
the opposite characteristics. My analysis exclusively employs Round 3 of the Afrobarometer 
due to the need to incorporate all five indicators of self-expression values and inconsistencies 
in survey items between each of the four rounds. Of the four questionnaires, only Round 2 
and Round 3 incorporate measures of social tolerance; however, the former does not measure 
interpersonal trust. Table 2.2 (next page) demonstrates how I approximated each of the five 
indicators of self-expression values, using both Inglehart’s index and the list of correlates 
found in WVS data (Table A.12).  
 
 
                                                 
18
 Cape Verde was included in the aggregate-level analysis. 
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Table 2.2: Operationalising Self-Expression Values 
Indicator WVS Items Afrobarometer Survey Items 
Post-Materialist 
Values (Index) 
Prioritises post-
materialist goals.  
- People should look after themselves and be 
responsible for their own success in life. 
- As citizens, we should be more active in questioning 
the actions of our leaders. 
- We should be able to join any organisation, whether 
or not the government approves of it. 
- The news media should be free to publish any story 
that they see fit without fear of being shut down. 
- People should be able to speak their minds about 
politics free of   government influence, no matter 
how unpopular their views are. 
Subjective Wellbeing 
(Index) 
Describes self as happy. - In general, how would you describe: 
 Your own present living conditions. 
 Your living conditions twelve months ago. 
 Your living conditions in twelve months. 
Social Tolerance 
(Construct) 
Agrees that 
homosexuality is 
justifiable.  
- In our country, women should have equal rights and 
receive the same treatment as men. 
- Women should have the same chance of being 
elected to political office as men. 
Political Activism 
(Index) 
Has or would sign a 
petition. 
- For each of these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these during the past 
year. If not, would you do this if you had the 
chance: Get together with others to raise an issue. 
- During the ast year, how often have you contacted 
any of the following persons about some important 
problem or to give them your views: 
 A local government councillor. 
 A parliamentarian. 
 A government ministry official. 
 A political party leader. 
Interpersonal Trust 
(Construct) 
Is not wary of trusting 
people.  
- Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you must be very careful in 
dealing with people? 
- How much do you trust each of the following 
groups of people: Batswana from other ethnic 
groups. 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005) 
As none of my five indicators corresponds exactly with the equivalent item on the 
WVS questionnaire, it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of my results and one can make 
limited comparisons between my results and those from the WVS. Furthermore, Inglehart’s 
index was computed via exploratory factor analysis on nation-level data from the first four 
rounds of the WVS and presents scores on a continuous ratio scale using standardised scores 
(cf. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005c: 12). My index, on the other hand, is an additive, continuous 
ratio scale comprising five aggregate measures to represent the same indicators—each of 
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which was computed, in turn, as an additive index or construct. All five indicators were 
weighted equally and the original scale was replicated to allow for comparison across both 
datasets: a score of -2.0 represents fully survivalist responses, while 2.0 represents fully self-
expressive responses, and 0.0 represents an equal number of responses in both sets (cf. 
Appendix B).  
Despite these methodological constraints, if the concept of self-expression values is as 
coherent Inglehart asserts, employing analogous Afrobarometer items to measure each 
indicator should create a fairly valid and reliable overall proxy of self-expression values. 
Predictor Variables 
Firstly, I grouped respondents by their class (as measured by occupation) and their 
residential location (urban or rural) to test the modernisation argument.  
Secondly, I created a measure of ‘existential security’ to test the scarcity hypothesis  
Although technically a subjective measure, Inglehart et al. measure this concept in terms of 
aggregate and individual income levels for comparison across and within societies, 
respectively. This study, conversely, argues that the concept refers to the extent to which 
physical survival is assured (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 23), and that it therefore needs to be 
broadened in the African context—as income does not necessarily guarantee physical 
survival in the developing world due to the threat of violence. I created an original, multi-
item index to capture three dimensions of material security: economic (access to basic goods 
and services), physical (lack of victimisation), and employment status. Each was aggregated 
as an average measure of each concept. 
In order to test the socialisation hypothesis, it is necessary to make some reference to 
past levels of existential security. As the WVS is not a panel study, the HDS employs birth 
cohorts to approximate shared experiences: “one’s subjective sense of security not only 
reflects one’s own personal security but is influenced by the general sense of security that 
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prevails in one’s social context” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 98). I categorised respondents 
according to their age during four key periods in Botswana’s economic development for my 
analysis in Chapter Four (Table 2.3, below). In the cross-national analysis in Chapter Five, 
however, I divided respondents into six groups covering ten years each—except for the oldest 
cohort, which includes citizens over the age of 68 years. This operationalisation therefore 
does not directly capture the cross-national variation in economic development trajectories. 
Table 2.3: Distribution of Economic Cohorts in Botswana (2005).19 
Development Stage Key Event Birth Year Age (years) n % 
Traditional 
Colonial economy, largely based 
on subsistence agriculture. 
1954 or earlier 51 or older 236 19.9 
Pre-Take-off 1968: Debswana established. 1955-1965 40-50 195 16.4 
‘Take-Off’ 
1980: Botswana enters lower-
middle-income status (by today’s 
standards). 
1966-1979 26-39 422 35.6 
Drive to Maturity 
1993: Botswana enters upper-
middle-income status. 
1980 onwards 18-25 334 28.1 
N=1,187 (Excludes respondents who could or would not provide their exact age). 
To test the cognitive hypothesis, I created three average measures of cognitive 
autonomy to capture the effect of cognitive skills (presumably acquired during schooling), 
engagement (discussion and interest in politics), and access to political information (media 
consumption). Although most of the existing research links tertiary education to pro-
democratic attitudes, the proportion of citizens with higher education is relatively low, hence 
the incorporation of the other two measures—based on Bratton et al.’s (2005) methodology.   
The final predictor variables are employed to test the ‘political learning’ model. In 
Chapter Four, I regroup respondents into political cohorts depending on whether they turned 
sixteen years old before or after the country’s democratic transition in 1966. This is replicated 
across the rest of the dataset in Chapter Five, according to each country’s respective 
transition year, in addition to two national-level variables. Furthermore, I incorporate two, 
national-level indicators. The first, ‘multiparty experience,’ measure represents the total 
number of years each country had experienced under multiparty rule since its most recent 
                                                 
19
 The development stage categories are based on Rostow’s ‘take-off’ model (Rostow, 1960). 
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transition in 2005 or 2006, depending on the year in which its survey took place. The second, 
‘democratic rights,’ provides a proxy for democratic quality by comparing countries’ levels 
of political and civil rights employing Freedom House scores. A reversed, additive index of 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores was employed—recoded from a minimum score of 
0 (7 on both original Freedom House dimensions) to a maximum of 12 (1 on both).  
Table 2.4: Predictor Variables  
Concept  Survey Item (Afrobarometer) 
Class
20
 
Item What is your main occupation? (If unemployed, retired, or 
disabled, what was your last main occupation?) 
Urban/Rural Location 
Item Do you come from a rural or urban area? (Answered by 
interviewer.) 
Economic Security  
Index Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family 
gone without:  
 Enough food to eat? 
 Enough clean water for home use?  
 Medicines or medical treatment? 
 Enough fuel to cook your food? 
A cash income? 
Physical Security 
Index Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in 
your family:  
 Feared crime in your own home? 
 Had something stolen from your house? 
Been physically attacked? 
Job Security 
Item Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it full-time or part-
time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are 
presently working)? 
Economic Cohort
21
 Item Calculated by age. 
Formal Education Item What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Cognitive Engagement 
Construct When you get together with your friends or family, would you 
say you discuss political matters? 
How interested would you say you are in public affairs? 
Media Consumption 
Index How often do you get news from the following sources: 
 Radio. 
 Television. 
 Newspaper. 
Political Cohort
22
 Item Calculated by age. 
Multiparty Experience  Item Years elapsed since most recent multiparty transition. 
Liberal Democracy Item Reverse, additive Freedom House score. 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 Codebook, Freedom House (2006). 
 
                                                 
20
 ‘White-collar workers’ include: commercial farmer, clerical worker, businessperson, professional worker, 
supervisor/forman, teacher, government worker, retail worker, student, politician, priest/imam, NGO 
employee. ‘Blue-collar workers:’ rest of the respondents (excludes housewives and unemployed, retired, and 
disabled respondents). 
21
 The cross-national analysis divides respondents into six groups: 18-27 years, 28-37 years, 38-47 years, 48-57 
years, 58-67 years, and those over the age of 68. The analysis excluded respondents who did not know their 
age and who reported being over the age of 114 because of the latter’s unlikeliness. 
22
 Although both Economic and Political Cohorts are calculated by age, the latter divides respondents into two 
groups: those who turned sixteen either prior to or after 1966. Consequently,  it captures a different sample 
from simply dividing the Economic Cohorts into two groups.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter outlined how this thesis conceptualised and measured the levels of self-
expression values in Botswana in order to evaluate the extent to which the HDS theory 
explains how cultural values form in both the country and the region. In order to confirm the 
scarcity hypothesis, there should be a positive correlation between socioeconomic legacies 
and self-expression values. Moreover, existential security and self-expression values must be 
the strongest predictor of these values in the overall model. If neither holds true, Botswana 
may be a disconfirming case in the post-materialism thesis. If only the former holds true and 
cognitive learning has a more significant effect on values, this may have important policy 
implications for the role of tertiary and civic education in developing democracy in Africa.  
In order to confirm the socialisation hypothesis, one should find both significant 
cohort differences in values priorities and a negative association between self-expression 
values and age (i.e. younger generations hold higher levels). Finding that neither assumption 
holds may indicate that socioeconomic growth occurred too recently or was not distributed 
widely enough to affect the current generation of youth, rather than disconfirming the theory. 
This effect must remain in the overall model to disprove the alternative modes of value 
formation (i.e. individual and life-time learning). 
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CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Phillip Converse’s seminal work on political attitudes defines a belief ‘system’ as “a 
configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form 
of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse, 1964: 207). Converse warns that 
while most scholars presume that belief systems’ constraints are universal, there are 
“important and predictable differences in ideational worlds” between elites and the general 
masses, which complicate the appropriate measurement and representation of these systems 
(Converse, 1964: 206). The HDS theory, on the other hand, assumes that cultural beliefs are 
shaped by universal motivations and therefore depend solely on environmental conditions.  
Inglehart’s measurement of post-modern values has evolved as the available WVS data 
expanded over time and into a growing number of societies with developing economies.
23
 In 
this chapter, I adapt Inglehart’s five-item self-expression values index to the Afrobarometer 
survey data in order to test the hypothesis that Batswana held moderately self-expressive 
values in 2005. 
Measuring Self-Expression Values in Botswana (2005) 
Self-expression values constitute a set of predictable norms and preferences shaped by 
“the most fundamental external constraint on human choice”: existential security (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005b: 138).
24
 As Inglehart’s thesis focuses on the transformation from survival to 
self-expressive values, however, his scale captures these concepts as two poles on a single 
continuum. Inglehart computes his survival/self-expression values index by aggregating 
results from the first four rounds of the World Values Survey conducting an exploratory 
factor analysis on the survey items that measure both dimensions of cross-cultural variation 
                                                 
23
 Inglehart and Welzel (2010) states that the most recent incarnation measures survival/self-expression values 
with a twelve-item additive index, which appears to be recoded from -2.0 to 3.0, but the article does not 
specify the consituent items (564, footnote 10). 
24
 As previously stated, this refers to a subjective sense of security, thus representing a ‘psychological’ 
constraint: “experienced as a logically constrained cluster of ideas” (Converse, 1964: 211). 
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(i.e. traditional/secular-rational values and survival/self-expression values; cf. Table A.11).
25
 
On the other hand, I explicitly concentrated on the latter dimension and thus created an 
additive index of seventeen items intended to represent conceptually equivalent measures of 
the second set of survey items. I categorised responses as self-expressive, survivalist, and—
wherever possible—neutral, in order to represent a value spectrum (cf. Appendix B).   
Post-Materialist Values 
The first indicator of self-expression values, ‘post-materialist values,’ represents the 
relative desirability of various societal goals, which gradually change over time as 
generations of citizens that grew up in an increasingly prosperous environment emerge 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005b: 23). The HDS measures these values with the four-item Post-
Materialist Values Index, which categorises respondents as ‘materialist,’ ‘mixed,’ or ‘post-
materialist’ depending on their selection of two national priorities out of four possible 
choices.
26
 A very similar measure was introduced in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, which 
found a strong majority of respondents (75%) in Botswana chose a response in both 
categories (i.e. ‘mixed’ orientation), while only 7% of respondents chose both post-
materialist responses and 18% chose both materialist responses (Table 3.1, below).  
Table 3.1: Afrobarometer Post-Materialist Values Measure (2008) 
If you had to choose, which one of the following things is:  Most important? 
(%) 
Next most 
important? (%) 
Maintaining order in the nation.  8.1 15.6 
Giving people more say in government decisions.* 15.8 30.8 
Protecting people’s right to live freely.* 10.8 32.2 
Improving economic conditions for the poor. 65.3 21.4 
* I interpret this response as post-materialist. 
Source: Afrobarometer 2008 survey. 
Unfortunately, these items were not included in the data under consideration in this 
study (Round 3); I consequently employ a five-item additive index that categorises 
                                                 
25
 The analysis specified that two factors be extracted: the first five items represent the traditional/secular-
rational value dimension, while the second set represents the survival/self-expression dimension (cf. Inglehart 
& Welzel, 2005c: 8-12 for the detailed methodology). 
26
 WVS questions: “For a nation, it is not always possible to obtain everything one might wish…Several 
different goals are listed. If you had to choose among them, which one seems most desirable to you?” “And 
which would be the next most important?” Responses: Maintaining order in the nation (1). Giving the people 
more say in important political decisions (0). Fighting rising prices (1). Protecting freedom of speech (0).  
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respondents according to their choice between two statements in each survey item. According 
to this scale, self-expressive citizens: support individualist over communitarian norms; are 
willing to question their leaders’ decisions; and they support freedom of association, press, 
and speech. Survivalist value preferences, on the other hand, represent the opposite views. 
Unlike the Round 4 question, these five items capture respondents’ attitudes towards rational-
legal authority (i.e. ‘the government’). As a result, the index likely captures the broader 
notion of ‘post-modern’ values, rather than post-materialist values (cf. Inglehart, 1997: 108). 
This is acceptable, however, as both reflect a choice of societal norms that corresponds to 
greater individual autonomy and self-expression. 
Figure 3.1: Preference for Postmodern Values in Botswana (2005) 
 
Overall, respondents reported strong support (71%) for the five measures of post-
modern values, which suggests that Batswana have already largely shifted towards an 
emphasis on individual autonomy (Figure 3.1, above).
27
 However, only half of the 
respondents agreed that ‘People should look after themselves and be responsible for their 
own success in life,’ which indicates fairly robust support for communitarian norms.28 This 
finding may therefore be related to the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) warnings that 
                                                 
27
 All index figures report the proportion of respondents with positive scores (i.e. >0) on the scale. 
28
 The WVS found that the opposing view, ‘The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-
being of people,’ is strongly correlated to survival values (r=.68) on Inglehart’s scale (Table A.11). 
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both the private sector and society at large are overly reliant on government services (AfDB, 
2009). Alternatively, it may indicate that this response captures libertarian, rather than 
individualist, ideals.  
This is a first indication of the difficulty of pairing Inglehart’s indicators to their 
equivalent Afrobarometer survey items. In order to confirm the scale’s validity, I conducted a 
factor analysis on the five items that indicated that both the ‘Individual’ and ‘Critical 
Citizenship’ items failed to load on the post-materialist values indicator. As reliability 
analysis further indicated that removing both items would increase the scale’s reliability, I 
converted the indicator as a three-item index (cf. Appendix C for all frequencies). This 
increased the average support for post-materialist values to 76% (Figure 3.2, below).  
Figure 3.2: Revised Post-Materialist Values Indicator (2005) 
 
Subjective Wellbeing 
The second indicator of self-expression values is a high level of ‘subjective 
wellbeing,’ which Inglehart asserts is the primary goal of postmodern societies (Table A.6). 
According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 139-140), there is an intrinsic and universal 
relationship between life satisfaction and individual autonomy. Inglehart measures this 
concept by calculating the respondents’ average evaluations of their personal happiness on a 
scale from 1 (‘very happy’) to 4 (‘not at all happy’) in the WVS survey. As the 
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Afrobarometer does not measure happiness, I substituted respondents’ evaluations of their 
individual living conditions (i.e. egocentric measure) for happiness because of its strong 
correlation with Inglehart’s survival/self-expression values index in the WVS data.29 I 
constructed an average scale of three items regarding respondents’ evaluation of their: 
present living conditions; perception of these conditions relative to the past; and expectations 
for the future. These three measures of respondents’ present, past, and future wellbeing 
capture a single, reliable concept of ‘subjective wellbeing’ (Eigenvalues=1.106, total variance 
explained=35.2%, Cronbach’s Alpha = .62). 
Figure 3.3: Evaluations of Individuals’ Living Conditions in Botswana (2005) 
 
In contrast to Botswana’s strong economic record and performance at the time, just 
30% of respondents reported positive evaluations on this scale in the 2005 survey (Figure 
3.3, above). Only a fifth of respondents evaluated their living conditions as ‘fairly good’ or 
‘very good’ and the same proportion reported that these conditions had improved from the 
previous year, while 44% expected an improvement in 2006. Although the scale is not 
directly equivalent to a measure of happiness, further analysis indicates that these evaluations 
                                                 
29
 WVS data indicates that ‘dissatisfaction with the financial situation of one’s household’ is highly correlated 
(r=.83) with survival values (Table A.11).  
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are based on relatively stable benchmarks and are consistent with other surveys’ findings on 
Batswana’s levels of happiness.  
Firstly, longitudinal analysis demonstrates that these evaluations have remained fairly 
steady over time: on average, 22% of respondents reported ‘fairly good’ or ‘very good’ 
present conditions, 29% reported that their conditions had improved, and 51% were 
optimistic about the future (Appendix C). Secondly, when asked to specify how they would 
evaluate their living conditions on a scale from 0 (‘poor’) to 10 (‘rich’) in 2003, respondents 
gave relatively low average evaluations of their financial circumstances (Table 3.2, below). 
On average, Batswana provide negative evaluations of their present wealth and indicated that 
they did not consider themselves to be significantly better off than their parents. They did, 
however, expect their children to attain higher levels than themselves, which echoes the 
pattern revealed in the subjective wellbeing scale index: low evaluations of the present in 
both absolute and relative terms, but optimism for the future. Lastly, Helliwell et al. (2012: 
31) further corroborate my results: the study found that Batswana’s average life evaluations 
were below 5 on the Cantril scale (i.e. ‘struggling’).30 
Table 3.2: Evaluation of Living Conditions (2003) 
On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 are “rich” people: Mean Median 
Which number would you give yourself today? 3.47 4 
Which number would you give your parents ten years ago? 3.26 3 
Which number do you expect your children to attain in the future? 7.19 8 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 (2003).  
This pessimistic outlook is therefore likely an indication of Botswana’s high levels of 
income inequality and structural unemployment, rather than measurement issues. While the 
country’s aggregate economic measures are undoubtedly impressive, Sentsho (2003) asserts 
that mineral-based economies like Botswana’s are often susceptible to poverty and inequality 
because the capital-intensive sector’s revenues tend to disincentivise economic diversification 
(‘Dutch Disease’) and hire relatively few workers. At present, the economy is highly reliant 
                                                 
30
 The Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale asks individuals to rank where they believe they stand on a ‘ladder’ 
from 0 (worst) to 10 (best), based on their individual life aspirations.  
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on the public sector and the wealthiest quintile of households in Botswana earned 71% of the 
total national income in 2003 (CSO, 2011: 1-9). Structural unemployment is another major 
concern—particularly for the country’s youth: 29% of Batswana aged 15-29 were 
unemployed in 2006 (Table A.5).  
Social Tolerance 
The third indicator of self-expression values is high ‘social tolerance,’ which 
Inglehart measures in terms of respondents’ acceptance of homosexuality on a scale from one 
(disapproval) to ten (acceptance).
31
 According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 143), 
declining existential threats lead to a corresponding rise in humanism in advanced industrial 
societies and thus greater support for individual freedom and human rights for ‘out-groups’—
including people of other races, nationalities and sexual orientation. I employ a two-item 
construct of support for gender equality: the first item measures support for equal rights, 
while the second support for equal opportunity for political office. Validity testing indicates 
that the two items are not highly correlated (r = .42), but are fairly reliable (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .59). 
Overall, three-quarters of respondents supported this measure of social tolerance 
(Figure 3.4, next page): 68% of respondents agreed that ‘Women should have the same 
chance of being elected to political office as men,’ which indicates strong support for this 
dimension of self-expression values. The WVS found the alternative response, ‘Men make 
better political leaders than women,’ to be highly correlated (r=.86) with survival values 
(Table A.12). Although a lower proportion (68%) of respondents indicated that ‘In our 
country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do,’ one 
could argue that this result may be due to the fact that the alternative statement (‘Women 
have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so’) is open to 
                                                 
31
 WVS survey item: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card: Homosexuality.” Responses form a scale 
from 1 to 10, where larger numbers represent a higher degree of acceptance. 
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interpretation: traditional customs and gender parity are not necessarily mutually-exclusive 
concepts.  
Figure 3.4: Support for Gender Equality in Botswana (2005) 
 
Given the long-standing effort to promote gender equality in Botswana since 
independence, it appears unlikely that this measure is an accurate proxy for tolerance for 
homosexuality given that Botswana is a conservative country in which same-sex sexual 
activity is a criminal offence. According to Ditshwanelo (2007), the 2002 legal decision 
upholding sodomy laws stated that individuals’ rights to privacy, association and freedom of 
expression were overridden by the need to support ‘public morality.’ At present, however, the 
Afrobarometer does not provide an alternative measure of social tolerance that is more 
equivalent to the original item.   
Political Activism 
The fourth indicator of self-expression values is a high level of ‘political activism,’ 
which Inglehart measures as an individual’s willingness to sign a petition—rather than 
traditional forms of civic engagement, such as voting or party activism.
32
 The Afrobarometer 
does not include the WVS survey item and it is difficult to find an equivalent measure that 
reflects this relatively passive mode of voicing one’s protest. According to Inglehart (1999), 
                                                 
32
 WVS survey responses: Have or would sign a petition (0); Abstention and would not (1).  
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citizenship in post-industrial societies is marked by an increasing emphasis on individualism 
over all forms of authority. I therefore created an index that combines respondents’ 
willingness to ‘Get together with others to raise an issue’ with four measures of political 
contact to gauge each respondent’s level of individual agency. 
Figure 3.5: Political Agency in Botswana (2005) 
 
Traditional forms of democratic engagement have been consistently low in Botswana: 
the country’s voting-age population (VAP) turnout, for example, has averaged at 37% for all 
ten elections (International IDEA, 2012). My analysis indicates that non-traditional measures 
of political agency are also very low: only 3% of respondents had contacted all four types of 
leaders and were willing to raise an issue with others (Figure 3.5, above).
33
 Although almost 
all the respondents reported that they were at least willing to raise an issue with other 
citizens, only 57% of respondents had actually done so. Furthermore, on average, less than a 
fifth of respondents had contacted any political actor within the previous year. The highest 
proportion of contact (26%) was with respondents’ local councillors—with whom one should 
theoretically have the most contact. Of those who did contact a leader, however, only 3% 
gave view on a ‘political issue,’ while 39% did so regarding a ‘public or community 
                                                 
33
 Factor analysis indicated that the first item loaded very weakly onto the dimension, but I chose to keep all five 
items due to the relatively high index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .67). 
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problem,’ and over half (54%) did so to discuss a ‘personal problem,’ which indicates that 
political activism is even lower than the overall figure of 31%.  
Molomo (2006) posits that Botswana’s non-participative political culture is due to 
remnants on the society’s traditional system of government via the kgotla (formal council of 
leaders and advisors), but the vast majority (85%) of respondents had never contacted a 
traditional leader. As this figure is comparable to the numbers of those who contacted 
parliamentarians, government officials and party representatives, the results indicate that 
Batswana’s reticence to voice their political views may be due to institutional, rather than 
cultural, constraints. This lack of direct contact, coupled with the lack of regular polling, may 
explain why government policies and actions are often misaligned with public opinion. For 
example, the National Assembly passed a 2008 bill proposing significant restrictions to the 
private media without much debate, despite the strong public support for press freedom 
demonstrated in Figure 3.1.  
Interpersonal Trust 
My final indicator of self-expression values is a high level of generalised 
interpersonal trust (also known as ‘bridging’ or ‘social’ trust), which refers to trust in people 
outside of an individual’s circle of acquaintances. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 
141), individuals that grow up in secure existential conditions are more socially autonomous 
as they do not feel that they have to rely on in-group identities and relationships to ensure 
their physical survival.  Ties between these citizens are consequently intrinsically shaped, 
rather than imposed by the constraint of existential threats, and the country’s social capital 
consequently transforms from bonding to bridging trust as this social autonomy grows. 
Inglehart’s self-expression values index employs the standard trust question, a well-
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established item that is widely used in the literature on social capital around the world that 
operationalises trust as a binary measure.
34
  
Molomo (2006) previously found low levels of social capital, measured in terms of 
membership in voluntary civic associations and trust in political institutions and politicians 
within the same survey sample, but did not examine the interpersonal dimension. As there is 
considerable debate regarding how to measure this concept, this thesis employs the standard 
trust question in conjunction with respondents’ trust in Batswana from other ethnic groups.35 
According to my construct, interpersonal trust is very low in Botswana: an average of only 
21% of Batswana demonstrated high levels of trust, despite the country’s relative ethnic 
homogeneity and peaceful, democratic experience (Figure 3.6, below). The proportion of 
Batswana who reported that they generally trusted ‘most people’ (6%) is, in fact, amongst the 
lowest in the world.
36
 
Figure 3.6: Interpersonal Trust in Botswana (2005) 
 
                                                 
34
 WVS survey item: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people?” Responses: (1) Most people can be trusted (i.e. ‘trust’). (2) Need to be 
very careful (i.e. ‘distrust’).  
35
 The two items are very weakly correlated (Pearson’s r=.12) and unreliable (Cronbach’s Alpha=.17), but I 
chose to keep both because the significant drop in the Standardised Trust Question between Rounds 1 and 3 
calls its reliability into question. 
36
 The only countries with lower scores in the most recent (fifth) wave of the WVS were: Turkey (4.9%), 
Rwanda (4.9%) and Trinidad and Tobago (3.8%). 
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According to Guido et al. (2010) the standard trust question’s results are dependent 
on how individual respondents interpret the question, as the latter option may be an indication 
of cautiousness, rather than mistrust per se. Furthermore, it is unclear why the proportion of 
those who agreed that ‘Most people can be trusted’ declined by eight points between the 1999 
and 2005 Afrobarometer surveys. As Table 3.4 (below) demonstrates, however, trust clearly 
declines as one moves beyond respondents’ immediate circle of acquaintances, which implies 
that in-group social identities remain important in Botswana. This result indicates that 
Botswana is likely to lean further towards survival values than I originally anticipated, given 
the centrality of this dimension in self-expression values.  
Table 3.3: Interpersonal Trust in Botswana (2005) 
How much do you trust each of the following types of 
people?  
A lot Somewhat Total Trust 
Type 
Your relatives 37.8 17.9 55.7 Bonding 
Your neighbours 21.3 19.7 41.0 Bonding 
People from your ethnic group 19.7 20.2 39.9 Bonding 
Batswana of other ethnic groups 14.9 20.2 35.1 Bridging 
N=1,169     
Results and Hypothesis Testing 
Inglehart conceptualises and measures self-expression values as the synthesis of post-
materialist values with high levels of subjective wellbeing, social tolerance, political activism 
and interpersonal trust. Figure 3.7 (next page), however, indicates that the majority of 
respondents supported post-materialist values (76%) and gender equity (75%), while 
significantly lower proportions reported high levels of subjective wellbeing (31%), political 
activism (31%) and interpersonal trust (21%). On average, a slight majority (53%) of 
responses were self-expressive, but this figure drops to 47% once the five aggregate measures 
are weighted equally across the fifteen survey items. Welzel and Inglehart (2008: 138) 
defines self-expression values as “reflect[ing] a synthesis of interpersonal trust, tolerance and 
political activism,” which suggests that these are the belief system’s central elements; 
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average support for the three sub-dimensions was even lower (42%) than across all five 
aggregate indicators. 
Figure 3.7: Self-Expressive Responses in Botswana (2005) 
 
Factor analysis of the five aggregate scales with maximum likelihood extraction and 
oblique rotation (direct oblimin) and reliability testing confirms that these value dimensions 
do not form a coherent, reliable measure of respondents’ value preferences. I conducted a 
second exploratory factor analysis on the fifteen constituent survey items, which confirms 
that they create five factors that correspond to each of the aggregate indicators (Appendix C). 
The fifteen items cumulatively explain 44% of the variance in respondents’ value preferences 
and create a fairly reliable scale (Cronbach’s Alpha=.46). The items provide more 
explanatory power on individual-level data than Inglehart’s index, which explains 13% of 
individual-level variation and a quarter of cross-national variation (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005b: 51). Although Inglehart’s scale is considerably more parsimonious, its relatively low 
explanatory power at both levels suggests that my scale’s validity problems may be related to 
Inglehart’s original conceptualisation and operationalisation. I conduct further validity testing 
in Chapter Five to investigate how well the fifteen items explain cross-national variation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Hypothesis Testing 
As previously mentioned, this thesis is restricted by the methodological difficulties of 
attempting to replicate Inglehart’s body of work employing a survey that was not specifically 
designed to capture the survival/self-expression value index. My results indicate that the 
fifteen items I employed provide a reasonable approximation of this cultural dimension given 
these methodological restrictions. I coded additive index to replicate Inglehart’s scale from -
2.0 (fully survivalist) to 2.0 (fully self-expressive), with 0.0 indicating a neutral position (i.e. 
an equal number of responses on both ends of the value spectrum). As Figure 3.8 (next page) 
demonstrates, value preferences were distributed fairly normally in Botswana (skewness=-
0.22, kurtosis=-0.02), but the survivalist end of the value spectrum extended further than the 
self-expressive pole: the minimum score was -1.73, while the maximum was 1.32 on the 
scale. The standard deviation was relatively high, however, as the majority of individual 
respondents’ scores were within 0.50 points of the mean.   
Figure 3.8: Distribution of Value Preferences in Botswana (2005) 
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Inglehart typically presents national-level self-expression values in terms of a 
society’s arithmetic mean score on his survival/self-expression values scale. Although 
Botswana has never been included in the WVS, Inglehart and Welzel (2005a) predicted that 
the country would have had a mean score of -0.20 in 2005, given its income and location in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on the country’s much-lauded socioeconomic and political 
experience, however, my first hypothesis was that Batswana would hold moderate levels of 
self-expression values. My analysis confirms that the country’s average scores were on the 
self-expressive end of the value spectrum, but they were further towards the neutral position 
that I anticipated: the mean score was 0.01 and the median score 0.03. Based on existing 
WVS data, Inglehart and Welzel’s predictive model had a mean prediction error of 0.34 for 
the fourth WVS wave, which was significantly lower than that based on a randomised model 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a: 188).
37
 My analysis indicates that my overall scale had a 
standard error of just 0.01, however, which indicates that my result is representative of the 
true mean value.
38
  
Conclusion 
Assuming that my indicators of self-expressive value preferences are at least roughly 
equivalent to those employed in the World Values Survey, this chapter has provided an initial 
descriptive analysis of self-expression values in the country. On average, Botswana were 
evenly divided between survivalists an self-expressive values on my scale in 2005. Reported 
subjective wellbeing, interpersonal trust and political activism were all low; furthermore, it is 
likely that the findings would have leaned further towards the survivalist pole if I had 
employed the original value orientations and tolerance measures. It therefore appears that my 
                                                 
37
 The model is based on the following formula: Survival/Self-Expression Values in 2005 = -0.349 + 1.03 x 
Cultural Zone factor - 0.019 x years under communist rule + 0.032 x GNI/capita, 2000 (in thousands) + 0.008 
x percentage employed in service sector,  2000 (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a: 191) 
38
 The individual indicators’ standard errors were: Post-Materialist Values (0.04), Subjective Wellbeing (0.02), 
Social Tolerance (0.04), Political Activism (0.03), and Interpersonal Trust (0.03). 
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hypothesis was incorrect, but citizens’ preferences varied widely from the most (1.32) to least 
(-1.73) self-expressive respondents on my scale. Moreover, the standard deviation indicates 
that two-thirds of the respondents fell within 0.5 points on either side of the mean (0.01). The 
following chapter contrasts the four theories of value formation in order to attempt to explain 
this variation in Batswana’s values.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS 
My analysis in the previous chapter demonstrates that Botswana’s democratic culture 
is not as self-expressive as one might expect given the country’s dramatic socioeconomic 
growth and political stability. On average, Batswana held a relatively middling position on 
the survival/self-expression value spectrum in 2005, though was a large variation in 
respondents’ overall preferences (M=0.01, SD=0.50). This result suggests that traditional 
beliefs continue to shape citizens’ contemporary political attitudes. Modernisation theory 
assumes that traditional structures, norms and behaviours inevitably give way to their modern 
forms as countries develop, but WVS data indicates that traditional, national heritages 
continue to shape the path along which societies modernise (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b). I 
therefore evaluate the extent to which emancipative valued are shaped by Botswana’s post-
colonial transformation—as opposed to cultural continuity—in this chapter.  
Testing Predictor Variables 
In this section, I test the effect of the predictor variables within the modernisation, 
HDS, cognitive and political learning hypotheses to measure the extent to which each 
variable explains how self-expression values form in Botswana. My fifteen-item self-
expression values index is the outcome variable in all the analyses and I conducted one-tailed 
tests, wherever appropriate, to reflect the fact that my hypotheses are directional.  
Modernisation: Residential Location and Employment Sector 
Modernisation theory implies that there are clear technological, organisational, and 
cultural distinctions between societies of differing levels of industrialisation. Traditional 
economies are agrarian; the population lives in small, rural communities and is primarily 
engaged in subsistence agriculture. Once an economy industrialises, however, the country 
becomes increasingly urbanised and people become employed in jobs that require 
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progressively higher levels of occupational specialisation. I grouped respondents by their 
residential location and occupation in order to test for cultural differences. If the 
modernisation argument is correct, living in an urban area and/or working in a white-collar or 
managerial job should be conducive to forming self-expression values.  I conducted two 
independent samples t-tests, which indicated that neither predictor variable had a significant 
effect on value preferences.  
As expected, on average, respondents living in urban areas of Botswana held 
moderate levels of self-expression values (M=0.04, SE=0.02), while those in rural areas 
leaned slightly towards survivalist values (M=-0.01, SE=0.02). This difference was not 
significant (t(1144)=-1.61, p>.05).  The cultural difference was even slighter between 
respondents working in professional or managerial occupations and those in ‘blue collar’ 
jobs: both groups held moderately self-expressive values and there was no significant 
difference (t(1073)=-1.20, p>.05).
39
 The effect sizes of both variables were very small 
(r>.01).  
Human Development Sequence: Existential Security 
Inglehart’s interpretation of Maslowian logic predicts that individuals living in 
prosperous (i.e. ‘secure’) conditions are more likely to prioritise self-expressive value 
priorities, while those living in scarce (‘insecure’) conditions are more likely to emphasise 
survivalist values. Based on this assumption (stripped of the socialisation hypothesis), one 
would expect to find a positive, linear relationship between material conditions and self-
expression values in Botswana. I conceptualise ‘existential security’ as the cumulative effect 
of economic, employment and physical security. Exploratory factor analysis and reliability 
testing indicated, however, that this proposed scale of existential security does not capture a 
coherent concept (Appendix C). I therefore conducted separate bivariate correlations for 
                                                 
39
 White collar workers: mean=0.06, SE=0.03. Blue-collar workers: mean=0.02, SE=0.02. 
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each of the three security dimensions and that only two were significantly related to my self-
expression values scale: economic and employment security. 
 The strongest relationship was between economic security (measured as access to 
basic goods) and emancipative values (r=.25, p<.001). Respondents’ job security also had a 
positive, but more modest, effect on forming emancipative values (r=.14, p<.001).
40
 
Respondents who reported lower levels of material deprivation and those in a more stable 
working environment were therefore more likely to hold self-expression values. These 
results, coupled with the finding that respondents’ levels of physical security had no 
statistically significant relationship with value preferences, appear to confirm the hypothesis 
that meeting the most basic level of human needs (i.e. physiological) provides a conducive 
environment for self-expression values to form. However, the HDS asserts that the scarcity 
hypothesis does not function in isolation from the socialisation hypothesis, which may 
explain the fairly weak correlation between material conditions and value preferences. 
Prosperous individuals are more likely to prioritise self-expressive concerns, but some of 
them hold survivalist values—presumabl  because they grew up under insecure conditions. 
Human Development Sequence: Economic Generation 
The socialisation hypothesis predicts that cultural values are formed prior to 
adulthood and that developing societies become progressively self-expressive via 
intergenerational replacement. Based on this assumption, each successive age cohort should 
grow up in a more prosperous environment than its predecessors and therefore lean further 
towards emancipative priorities. Botswana has experienced massive economic growth since 
independence and therefore one would presume that citizens of varying age cohorts have had 
substantially different formative experiences. This study grouped respondents by their age in 
                                                 
40
 This variable was measured as an ordinal scale, ranking respondents from the most secure (employed full-
time), to the least (unemployed and looking for work). 
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2005 (cf. Table 2.3) and a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that value 
preferences differed significantly across these cohorts, F(3, 1130)=5.06, p<.01.  
Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Value Preferences by Economic Cohort 
Economic Cohort n % Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Traditional 220 19.4 -0.10 0.59 -1.73 1.18 
Pre Take-Off 188 16.6 -0.00 0.48 -1.69 1.32 
Take-Off 406 35.8 0.04 0.47 -1.64 1.25 
Drive to Maturity 320 28.2 0.06 0.46 -1.33 1.07 
Total 1,134 100 0.01 0.50 -1.73 1.32 
However, the cohort effect was relatively small (eta=.11) and I also find a similarly 
weak correlation between age and value preferences (τ=-.072, p<.001).41 As expected, mean 
scores were progressively higher from the oldest (born 1906-1955) to youngest (born 1980-
1987) cohorts, but there was a wide variation in scores within each cohort (Table 4.1, above). 
Although the two youngest cohorts both had positive mean scores, the ‘Drive to Maturity’ 
cohort surprisingly had the lowest maximum score on the scale, which suggests that there 
were a number of outliers within all four groups that skewed these results. This consequently 
appears to confirm Ntsabane’s (2005) argument that socialisation agents within families and 
schools have failed to socialise Batswana youth into a pro-democratic culture because parents 
and teachers continue to hold traditional, non-democratic norms. 
Table 4.2: Post Hoc Results for Value Preferences by Economic Cohort 
Economic Cohort N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
Traditional 220 -0.10  
Pre Take-Off 188 -0.00 -0.00 
Take-Off 406  0.04 
Drive to Maturity 320  0.06 
N=1,134 
As Table 4.2 (above) demonstrates, Tukey B post hoc procedure appears to confirm 
the socialisation hypothesis’ assertion that there is a time lag between socioeconomic growth 
and cultural change. Rather than forming four distinct subsets, the ‘Pre-Take-Off’ cohort 
(respondents born 1956-1965) straddles the two subsets dividing young and old respondents. 
                                                 
41
 Kendall’s tau (τ) was employed due to the large number of ‘tied ranks’ in the distribution (i.e. number of 
respondents with the same age). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 47 
As previously stated, however, the socialisation hypothesis posits that value preferences are 
determined by an individual’s formative conditions, thus implying an interaction between 
existential security and age.   I therefore recalculated the correlation between my measures of 
existential security and the self-expression values index within these cohort clusters—
dividing respondents by whether they were born prior to 1966 (i.e. Traditional and Pre Take-
off cohorts), or afterwards (Take-Off and Drive to Maturity). The results (Table 4.3, below) 
confirm that there was no substantial intergenerational difference.   
Table 4.3: Correlation with Self-Expression Values by Cohort Group 
 Traditional/Pre Take-
Off 
Take-Off/Drive to 
Maturity 
Total Sample 
Economic Security .24 .23 .25 
Job Security  .16 .14 .14 
N 431 756 1,187 
Cognitive Learning: Education, Engagement, Awareness 
The cognitive hypothesis asserts that the increasing level of formal education brought 
on by economic growth is an agent of cultural change because it promotes the formation of 
independent beliefs and critical evaluations associated with emancipative values (cf. 
Inglehart, 1999). The HDS model, on the other hand, asserts that education is a marker of 
wider (i.e. socioeconomic) privilege: “A high level of education is an indicator that an 
individual grew up with a sufficiently high level of existential security to take survival for 
granted – and therefore gives top priority to autonomy, individual choice, and self-
expression” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 37). Existing studies all emphasise the role of 
tertiary education, however, in forming pro-democratic values—indicating a non-linear 
relationship between cognitive development and cultural preferences. I therefore grouped 
respondents according to their levels of cognitive autonomy, which was measured as the 
cumulative effect of formal education, cognitive engagement (interest in and discussion of 
politics), and political awareness (media consumption). 
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Table 4.4: Means and Standard Deviations of Value Preferences by Cognitive Autonomy 
Cognitive Autonomy n % Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Low 175 15.5 -0.18 0.54 -1.73 0.96 
Moderate 491 43.6 -0.03 0.46 -1.41 1.15 
High 411 36.5 0.12 0.48 -1.69 1.20 
Very High 49 4.4 0.26 0.52 -0.85 1.32 
Total 1,126 100 0.02 0.50 -1.73 1.32 
A one-way ANOVA indicated that cognitive development had a significant, positive 
effect on respondents’ value preferences, F(3, 1122)=21.2, p<0.001; this difference 
represents a medium-sized effect (r=.23).  Tukey B post hoc procedure found that 
respondents with either ‘high’ or ‘very high’ levels of cognitive autonomy were significantly 
different from the rest of the sample, which suggests that the cognitive model is at least 
complementary to the HDS (Table 4.5, below). Interestingly, the bottom two groups were 
also significantly different from one another, which indicates that greater engagement and 
awareness supplements low formal education levels when forming self-expressive value 
preferences. As my cognitive autonomy measure is a continuous scale, I calculated its 
correlation with my self-expression values scale to contrast its explanatory power to the 
scarcity hypothesis. Cognitive autonomy has a fairly weak, positive correlation with self-
expression values (r=.26), which was similar to the relationship between these norms and 
existential security (r=.25), but larger than the effect of job security (r=.14) and economic 
cohort (r=.11). 
Table 4.5: Post Hoc Results for Value Preferences by Cognitive Autonomy 
Cognitive Autonomy N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 3 
Low 175 -0.18   
Moderate 491  -0.03  
High 411   0.12 
Very High 49   0.26 
N=1,126 
Political Learning 
Political learning assumes that direct experience of democracy provides an 
environment conducive to self-expression values because citizens are socialised into pro-
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democratic attitudes via institutions etc. As this is an environmental explanation, I therefore 
categorised respondents according to whether they turned sixteen years old prior to or after 
Botswana’s founding elections in 1965, rather than based on behavioural measures. An 
independent samples t-test indicates that respondents socialised during the colonial era 
prioritised survival values (M=-0.13, SE=0.05) on my self-expression scale, while those 
socialised under multiparty rule leaned slightly towards self-expressive values (M=0.04, 
SE=0.02). This difference was significant (t(209) =.001, p<.001); however, its effect was 
very slight (r<.001).  
Predicting Value Preferences in Botswana 
The previous analysis provides tentative support for all four theories: existential 
security, cognitive development and democratic experience all had a positive effect on 
forming self-expression values in 2005, while age had the opposite effect. This section 
evaluates the four theories within a single explanatory model via a series of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression. As its name implies, OLS regression assumes a linear relationship 
between the outcome variable and all predictor variables. Unstandardised Beta coefficients 
(‘B’) indicate the strength, direction and statistical significance of each variable’s unique 
contribution to predicting the outcome variable (self-expression values). Standardised Beta 
coefficients (‘b’), on the other hand, provide each explanatory variable’s relative contribution 
to predicting value preferences.
42
 Substantively, this indicates the extent to which each 
predictor variable explains the variation in respondents’ value preferences above and beyond 
all the other variables in the model. A positive coefficient therefore indicates an effect on 
self-expression values, while a negative coefficient indicates an effect on forming survival 
values.  
  
                                                 
42
 In this analysis, a positive coefficient indicates an effect on self-expression values, while a negative 
coefficient indicates an effect on forming survival values. 
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Contrasting Explanatory Models 
The first four regression models test the effect of the predictive variables addressed 
earlier in this chapter, while the fifth tests whether traditional norms continue to shape 
citizens’ cultural values above and beyond all of the socioeconomic and political changes 
Botswana has experienced since independence. I included this hypothesis in the explanatory 
model in order to improve upon these explanations given the available literature on 
Botswana, which generally characterises Botswana’s democracy in terms of continuity with 
pre-colonial institutions, behaviours, and norms. The national government’s self-conscious 
preservation of these traditional structures and value may have therefore slowed the pace of 
cultural transformation, in spite of the country’s rapid modernisation and globalisation. I 
employed respondents’ attachment to traditional (ethnic) over modern (national) social 
identities, attitudes towards clientelism, and whether they supported the current practice of 
the vice-president’s automatic succession to the presidency when incumbents step down.43  
Firstly, I compared each hypothesis’ block adjusted R2 to evaluate its overall ability to 
predict self-expression values—in isolation from the competing explanations. Table 4.6 (next 
page) demonstrates that the HDS and cognitive learning explained the most variance in 
respondents’ value preferences in 2005: respondents’ economic and job security, coupled 
with their cohort, explained 7.3% of the variance; furthermore, their levels of formal 
education, cognitive engagement and media consumption, on the other hand, explained 6.7%. 
On the other hand, political learning and traditional norms each explained just over 1%, while 
modernisation variables only explained 0.1%—even in the absence of other variables. 
                                                 
43
 I include the latter because it is a notable example of traditional norms of ‘hereditary’ political power 
preserved in Botswana’s contemporary democracy (cf. Maundeni, 2005; Good, 2008). The process occurred in 
1998, when Sir Ketumile Masire retired, and in 2008, when his former vice president, Festus Mogae, retired. 
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Table 4.6: OLS Regressions 1-5 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Adjusted 
R
2 
(block) B b B b B b B b B b 
(Constant) .002 
(.021) 
 -.441 
(.061) 
 -.545 
(.068) 
 -.551 
(.072) 
 -.478 
(.075) 
  
Modernisation           .001 
Urban .037 
(.030) 
.038 -.039 
(.031) 
-.039 -.085 
(.036) 
-.088** -.087 
(.032) 
-.088** -.093 
(.032) 
-.094**  
‘White-Collar’ .034 
(.034) 
.030 -.042 
(.035) 
-.037 -.085 
(.036) 
-.076* -.085 
(.036) 
-.076* -.078 
(.035) 
-.071*  
Human Development Sequence           .073 
Access to Basic Goods/Services   .127 
(.019) 
.210*** .109 
(.020) 
.179*** .109 
(.020) 
.178*** .114 
(.020) 
.185***  
Employment Status   .053 
(.013) 
.130*** .031 
(.013) 
.077* .031 
(.013) 
.076* .030 
(.013) 
.074*  
Economic Cohort   .028 
(.014) 
.053 -.018 
(.017) 
-.038 -.021 
(.020) 
-.045 -.015 
(.015) 
-.033  
Cognitive Learning           .067 
Formal Education     .066 
(.024) 
.116** .066 
(.024) 
.116** .065 
(.024) 
.114**  
Cognitive Engagement     .054 
(.022) 
.078* .053 
(.022) 
.078* .055 
(.022) 
.081*  
Media Consumption     .051 
(.016) 
.126** .051 
(.016) 
.126** .042 
(.016) 
.104**  
Political Learning           .014 
Post-Transition Generation       .015 
(.058) 
.010 -.010 
(.058) 
-.007  
Traditional Norms           .012 
Traditional Identity         -.162 
(.046) 
-.105**  
Supports Clientelism         -.019 
(.044) 
-.013  
Supports Auto. VP Succession         -.082 
(.030) 
-.082**  
Total Variance Explained (R
2
) .003 .068 .105 .105 .120  
Total Adjusted R
2
 .001 .063 .098 .097 .109  
N=1,010.                                                                          Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index.                                                                *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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Each regression model’s total adjusted R2 takes the number of variables into account 
when calculating the total variance explained; therefore it indicates which model best 
represents how Batswana’s values formed in 2005. A rise in the adjusted R2 indicates that the 
additional variables improved the regression model’s explanatory power; conversely, a fall 
means that the additional variables did not do so above the effect of random chance and 
removing them would consequently improve the model’s parsimony. Overall, the final model 
best predicts how value preferences formed, as it explained 11% of the total cultural 
variation. This result confirms that respondents’ attachment to traditional continues to shape 
their political orientations, particularly as the model made a unique contribution of 1.2% to 
the overall explanatory power. As the model’s adjusted R2 was also 1.2% in the absence of 
any other variable, it appears to have no conceptual overlap with any of the other models.  
Model 5 indicates that respondents who reported attachment to traditional identities 
and support for automatic leadership succession were more likely to emphasise survival 
values (b=-1.05 and b=-.082, respectively), while support for clientelism had no significant 
cultural effect. The political generation variable, on the other hand, had no significant, unique 
effect on self-expression values and its inclusion reduced the third model’s explanatory 
power. This result consequently suggests that it explains 1.4% of the variance when assessed 
individually because it is driven by another, overarching explanation. I will therefore shift my 
focus to the effect of socioeconomic legacies on cultural values. 
Socioeconomic Legacies and Value Formation 
The first regression model demonstrates that the modernisation variables explained 
only 0.1% of the variance in self-expression values and that, on average, a respondent living 
in a rural community and holding a ‘blue-collar’ position held a neutral position on the 
survival/self-expression values spectrum (Constant=.002). Only when the cognitive variables 
were added in Model 3 did this change: respondents living in an urban environment and those 
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who had a professional occupation were more likely to prioritise survival values (b=-.088 and 
b=-.076, respectively). Although this result refutes the modernisation argument, the effect 
was maintained when the political and traditionalism measures were added in the subsequent 
regression models. It is therefore difficult to interpret in the overall context of socioeconomic 
explanations, as urbanisation and industrialisation should both be complementary to rising 
existential security and education levels.  
Prior to evaluating the HDS and cognitive hypotheses, it is important to note that both 
acknowledge the role of environmental and cognitive factors in shaping cultural beliefs but 
differ in their emphases (Figure 4.1, below). The HDS’ environmental logic posits that 
existential conditions (scarcity hypothesis) prior to adulthood (socialisation hypothesis) 
determine one’s value preferences. Emancipative values are therefore effectively formed by 
the experience of growing up in a secure environment (i.e. past conditions). Dalton (2009), 
on the other hand, found that higher education was strongly associated with both forms of 
citizenship—particularly engaged citizenship—but that there was a negative relationship 
between respondents’ income and engaged citizenship norms. The cognitive logic therefore 
suggests that emancipative value priorities are shaped by cognitive autonomy. This implies 
that increasing one’s cognitive abilities, engagement and awareness affects value 
preferences—presumably at any age. This section will therefore address the relative effect of 
each model’s predictor variables on forming self-expression values. 
Figure 4.1: Contrasting Logics of Value Formation 
 
 
  
Rising 
Education 
Levels 
Reduced 
Cognitive 
Constraints 
Greater 
Cognitive 
Autonomy 
Rising 
Living 
Standards 
Greater 
Existential 
Security 
Higher- 
Order     
Motivations 
 
 
Emancipative 
Values 
 
Socioeconomic 
Development 
Environmental Logic 
Cognitive Logic 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 54 
As a result of this conceptual overlap, there is considerable multicollinearity between 
the HDS and cognitive hypotheses: each accounts for 7.3% and 6.7% of the variance in self-
expression values when analysed in isolation, but the final regression model only explains 
11% of the total variance in respondents’ beliefs. Comparing each individual variable 
indicates that all three cognitive factors had a significant effect on cultural values, while only 
two of the HDS measures did so. Economic cohort consistently failed to make a significant 
contribution to the regression models, thereby disconfirming the socialisation. Both measures 
of existential security and all three of cognitive autonomy had a positive effect on self-
expression values, which confirms both the scarcity and cognitive hypotheses. Of the five 
variables, respondents’ economic security was consistently the best predictor of value 
preferences (b=.185 in Model 5), followed by formal education (b=.114); furthermore, both 
political awareness (b=.104) and cognitive engagement (b=.081) had a greater effect than 
respondents’ employment status (b=.074).  
Conclusion 
My explanatory analysis provides evidence that corroborates the scarcity and 
cognitive hypotheses, but indicates that there was no generational effect on Batswana’s 
values—whether conceptualised in terms of economic or political cohorts. Furthermore, it 
indicated that urbanisation and industrialisation only impacted value preferences in 
combination with other factors. These results indicate that Botswana’s socioeconomic 
development has had a substantial cultural effect, largely driven by rising economic and 
cognitive autonomy. The OLS regression models confirm that there is substantial conceptual 
overlap between the HDS and cognitive explanations’ ability to predict Batswana’s value 
preferences, but it is unclear whether educational attainment’s effect on democratic values is 
largely a reflection of privilege, rather than cognition (Inglehart & Wezel, 2005b: 37).  
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Overall, the HDS’ predictor variables cumulatively explain more of the variation in 
Batswana’s values than the cognitive measures, but the generational mode of learning was 
disconfirmed. Instead, learning occurred on an individual basis, as per the scarcity and 
cognitive hypotheses. This indicates that Batswana living in secure environments and with 
greater levels of cognitive autonomy are more likely to be self-expressive citizens—
regardless of their age. The subsequent chapter tests whether Batswana’s values have formed 
on a collective basis as well by contrasting these norms to those of other Africans.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Scholars generally agree that Sub-Saharan African societies, although unquestionably 
diverse, share a fundamental set of common values shaped by the legacies of traditional 
communal life and colonial rule. Despite Botswana’s record of sustained economic growth 
and democratic stability, my previous analyses indicated that Batswana were fairly evenly 
divided between self-expressive and survivalist priorities. Furthermore, socioeconomic and 
cognitive factors had the most significant effect on forming self-expression values, while 
respondents who reported an attachment to traditional norms were more likely, on average, to 
emphasise survival values. These findings corroborate cross-national WVS evidence, which 
indicates that African citizens are less likely to hold self-expression values than their 
socioeconomic indicators would otherwise predict (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b).
44
 Given 
Botswana’s unique development trajectory, however, this chapter addresses whether the 
country is an outlier in the region—not only in terms of the society’s aggregate score, but 
also in terms of how individual citizens’ values form. 
Value Preferences in Sub-Saharan Africa 
My descriptive analysis indicated that Botswana had a mean score of 0.01 on my 
fifteen-item survival/self-expression values scale, which would have made it the highest score 
amongst the African countries in the fifth wave of the WVS (2005-2008) and tied for twenty-
fourth position globally, with Thailand (Table A.15). As a limited number of African 
countries have been included in the WVS, however, the following section further tests my 
hypothesis by comparing Batswana to other Africans on the same, fifteen-item scale (cf. 
                                                 
44
 The nine ‘cultural deviation factors’ were: English-Speaking (.58); Protestant Europe (.54); Catholic Europe 
(.05); Latin America (0.03); South Asia (-.29); Sub-Saharan Africa (-.45); Confucian (-.49); Orthodox (-.50); 
and Islamic (-.71; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005b: 74, Table 2.5). 
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Appendix C for frequencies and results of validity testing).
45
 According to my analysis, 
Afrobarometer Round 3 respondents were slightly survivalist (M=-0.026), but there was a 
fairly large variation in value preferences from the least (-1.92) to most (1.89) self-expressive 
respondents (Table 5.1, below).  
Table 5.1: Value Preferences by Country (Afrobarometer Scale) 
Rank Country N Mean SD 
Std. 
Error 
Min. Max. 
1 Mozambique 911 0.188 0.5 0.0165 -1.59 1.71 
2 Madagascar 996 0.141 0.46 0.0146 -1.47 1.37 
3 Senegal 1,051 0.134 0.53 0.0164 -1.38 1.61 
4 South Africa 1,047 0.125 0.53 0.0163 -1.81 1.82 
5 Ghana 1,069 0.061 0.52 0.0158 -1.57 1.73 
6 Uganda 1,172 0.054 0.54 0.0157 -1.67 1.89 
7 Tanzania 963 0.023 0.45 0.0145 -1.33 1.42 
8 Namibia 1,106 0.021 0.51 0.0154 -1.72 1.53 
9 Botswana 1,146 0.01 0.5 0.0146 -1.73 1.32 
10 Kenya 1,095 -0.014 0.52 0.0157 -1.61 1.47 
11 Zambia 1,117 -0.027 0.53 0.0158 -1.92 1.75 
12 Benin 1,071 -0.106 0.47 0.0143 -1.67 1.34 
13 Cape Verde 947 -0.11 0.42 0.0137 -1.52 1.71 
14 Zimbabwe 1,168 -0.143 0.33 0.0097 -1.34 0.62 
15 Nigeria 1,141 -0.145 0.52 0.0153 -1.73 1.52 
16 Mali 1,145 -0.217 0.62 0.0182 -1.8 1.51 
17 Lesotho 1,136 -0.226 0.59 0.0174 -1.92 1.71 
18 Malawi 1,137 -0.226 0.52 0.0154 -1.72 1.57 
Total Sample 19,418 -0.025 0.5 0.0153 -1.92 1.89 
Hypothesis Testing 
Contrary to my expectations, Batswana’s responses were not significantly more self-
expressive than other Africans across the five aggregate indicators, despite Botswana’s 
comparative wealth, political stability, and ethno-linguistic homogeneity. Overall, 
Botswana’s aggregate score was in the middle of the distribution of Afrobarometer countries. 
Surprisingly, Mozambique, Madagascar and Senegal occupied the top three positions, 
thereby also outscoring South Africa (fourth) and Namibia (seventh)—whose socioeconomic, 
education and democratic indicators were comparable to Botswana’s in 2005 (Table A.9). 
                                                 
45
 Due to inconsistencies in the Cape Verdean and Zimbabwean questionnaires, I computed Cape Verde’s score 
by using the standard trust question as the single indicator of interpersonal trust, while I substituted missing 
values with the Afrobarometer mean score wherever a question was missed in Zimbabwe. Although the latter 
method is generally discouraged, Zimbabwe was one of only eight countries in both surveys, which 
necessitated its inclusion in this analysis.  
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Mozambique had the lowest HDI score (.285) in the dataset and amongst the lowest 
proportions of service sector employment (16%), while just over half (55%) of the population 
over fifteen years old was literate. Furthermore, the country is not only a newer democracy, 
but lags behind other countries that transitioned in the early-to-mid 1990s in terms of 
democratic rights. Mozambique’s score on my self-expression values index (M=0.188, 
SE=0.02) is consequenly difficult to interpret, as it may be indication that these countries are 
outliers in both the HDS and cognitive models or, alternatively, highlight underlying 
problems in my scale’s conceptualisation or operationalisation. 
In order to test whether my scale captures an analogous concept to Inglehart’s index 
(i.e. ‘self-expression values’), I plotted my results with the most recent available WVS scores 
in the eight countries that participated in both studies: Ghana (2007); Mali (2007); Nigeria 
(2000); South Africa (2007); Tanzania (2001); Uganda (2007); Zambia (2007); and 
Zimbabwe (2001).
46
 As Table 5.2 (next page) demonstrates, my scale came closest to the 
WVS results in Mali (my score was 0.13 points below the WVS figure) and Tanzania (0.17 
points above), while my findings were substantially different in Zimbabwe (1.22 higher). The 
latter result is probably due to my use of means substitution in six items across all three 
essential indicators of self-expression values (tolerance, activism and trust) in Zimbabwe. As 
Chapter Three explained, my scale’s overall overestimation of 0.19 points (excluding 
Zimbabwe) is probably due to the differences in how the two scales measure value 
orientations and social tolerance. Despite these methodological inconsistencies, the fifteen 
items in my survival/self-expression values index cumulatively explained 34% of the total 
variance, which is higher than Inglehart’s scale in the WVS. Although this figure is lower 
than their explanatory power in Botswana (44%), fourteen of the fifteen variables loaded onto 
the five resulting factors, while only twelve did so in Botswana (Appendix C).  
                                                 
46
 Grouping WVS waves is appropriate because the socialisation hypothesis posits that cultural change is very 
gradual (cf. Table A.6 for Nigeria and South Africa’s scores across time).  
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Table 5.2: Comparative Self-Expression Values Scores 
Country 
Afrobarometer 
SEV Index 
WVS  
SEV Index 
Difference 
Ghana 0.06 -0.29 0.35 
Mali -0.21 -0.08 -0.13 
Nigeria -0.14 0.28 -0.42 
South Africa 0.13 -0.10 0.23 
Tanzania 0.02 -0.15 0.17 
Uganda 0.08 -0.50 0.58 
Zambia -0.03 -0.62 0.59 
Zimbabwe -0.14 -1.36 1.22 
Average -0.03 -0.35 0.32 
Value Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
My findings in the previous section disconfirm my hypothesis that Botswana would 
have the highest proportion of self-expressive citizens. The country had neither the highest 
percentage of self-expressive responses across the five aggregate indicators, nor the highest 
mean score on my index; value formation is clearly more complicated than I had initially 
assumed. In order to determine whether Botswana’s value structure is largely the result of 
unique, internal factors or due to a shared, African cultural heritage, the following section 
will evaluate how self-expression values form in Sub-Saharan Africa. The five explanatory 
models have varying interpretations of the mode in which self-expression values form. 
Cognitive learning assumes that individual characteristics (cognition) determine these 
preferences; conversely, the ‘traditional norms’ and political learning hypotheses assume that 
values form as the result of collective learning. The HDS asserts that self-expression values 
result from the combined effect of individual (scarcity hypothesis) and societal (socialisation 
hypothesis) existential security.  
In the first analysis, I test how individual Africans’ values form via OLS regressions 
on micro-level data from sixteen of the eighteen countries; I compare the effects of the five 
explanatory models, before controlling for national-level effects.
47
 In the second analysis, I 
                                                 
47
 I conducted the analysis on unweighted data and excluded Cape Verde and Zimbabwe because of the 
differences in how I calculated the dependent variable in both nations. 
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employ aggregate data from seventeen nations to corroborate my findings and further assess 
the extent to which societal-level factors influence these values.
48
  
Micro-level Analysis 
The first five OLS regressions replicate the analysis in the previous chapter; they 
therefore employ the same variables wherever possible. The ‘traditional norms’ model only 
includes two items, however, as the question regarding support for automatic succession is 
not applicable outside the context of Botswana’s democracy. Furthermore, given the wide 
variety in economic legacies, the HDS model includes a general, ‘age cohort’ variable that 
divides citizens into six groups by their ages in terms of decades. The ‘post-transition’ cohort, 
on the other hand, replicates the methodology used in the national-level analysis: I divided 
respondents into two groups, based on whether they turned sixteen prior to or during each 
nation’s most recent transition to multiparty democracy. This simplifies the political 
trajectories of most African countries, as many experienced multiple regime types after 
gaining independence (cf. Bratton et al, 2005). 
Comparing the hypotheses’ block adjusted R2 demonstrates that cognitive factors 
accounted for the most variance (6%) by a substantial margin; the HDS explained 2% of the 
cultural variation, which reverses the order in Botswana (Table 5.3, next page). Political 
learning had a smaller effect than it had in Botswana, which suggests that the differences 
between Africans socialised during multiparty democracy are not as different from those 
socialised under autocratic rule as is the case in Botswana. Multiparty rule is relatively new in 
most of the Afrobarometer countries and presumably most citizens have not had enough 
direct experience of democracy.  The five models cumulatively explained 8% of the total 
cultural variation and the political learning hypothesis made no unique contribution to the 
overall model, which suggests that socioeconomic factors shape cultural norms in the region.  
                                                 
48
 The analysis excludes Zimbabwe. 
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Table 5.3: OLS Regressions 1-5 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Adjusted 
R
2 
(block) B b B b B b B b B b 
(Constant) -.038 
(.006) 
 -.137 
(.019) 
 -.297 
(.020) 
 -.313 
(.021) 
 -.279 
(.075) 
  
Modernisation           .009 
Urban .019 
(.009) 
.017* -.011 
(.009) 
-.010 -.068 
(.009) 
-.061*** -.067 
(.009) 
-.061*** -.070 
(.009) 
-.063***  
‘White-Collar’ .106 
(.009) 
.092*** .093 
(.009) 
-.081*** .015 
(.010) 
.013 -.016 
(.010) 
.014 .018 
(.010) 
.016  
Human Development Sequence           .022 
Access to Basic Goods/Services   .064 
(.005) 
.112*** .043 
(.005) 
.075*** .044 
(.005) 
.076*** .042 
(.005) 
.073***  
Employment Status   .023 
(.004) 
.048*** .014 
(.004) 
.030*** .012 
(.004) 
.026** .012 
(.004) 
.026**  
Age Cohort   -.021 
(.003) 
-.056*** -.029 
(.003) 
-.075*** -.023 
(.004) 
-.060*** -.020 
(.004) 
-.053***  
Cognitive Learning           .055 
Formal Education     .068 
(.006) 
.116*** .066 
(.006) 
.113*** .062 
(.006) 
.106***  
Cognitive Engagement     .077 
(.005) 
.120*** .077 
(.022) 
.119*** .073 
(.005) 
.113***  
Media Consumption     .046 
(.004) 
.103*** .032 
(.011) 
.105*** .048 
(.004) 
.107***  
Political Learning           .001 
Post-Transition Generation       -.032 
(.011) 
-.028** -.041 
(.011) 
-.036***  
Traditional Norms           .012 
Traditional Identity         -.123 
(.011) 
-.084***  
Supports Clientelism         -.037 
(.009) 
-.030***  
Total Variance Explained (R
2
) .010 .028 .068 .069 .078  
Total Adjusted R
2
 .009 .027 .068 .068 .078  
N=16,056.                                                                              Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index.                                                                                      *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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The values for the total variance explained and adjusted R
2
 are equal in OLS 
Regression 5, which indicates that the model is parsimonious; in fact, all of the variables in 
the final model had a significant effect on value preferences except respondents’ occupation. 
As expected, greater existential security and cognitive autonomy are conducive to self-
expression values, while attachment to traditional norms has a significant effect on forming 
survival values. Contrary to the HDS’ assumptions, younger generations of Africans were 
generally slightly more survivalist than the oldest respondents (b=-.053), furthermore, being 
socialised in the post-transition era had the same effect (b=-.036). Overall, the cognitive 
model’s predictor variables had the most unique contribution to the model: cognitive 
engagement had the greatest effect (b=.113) on respondents’ values, followed by media 
consumption (b=.107) and formal education (b=.106). Economic security, on the other hand, 
had a smaller effect (b=.073) than attachment to traditional social identities (b=-.084)—in 
contrast to its leading role in shaping Batswana’s values.   
Table 5.4 (next page) controls for the countries other than Botswana in order to 
contrast their respective citizens’ values with Batswana by employing dummy variables, 
which recodes respondents from that nation as 1 and the rest of the dataset as 0. The model’s 
intercept (i.e. ‘Constant’) therefore indicates that a Motswana with all the attributes expected 
to result in survival values would have a score of -0.28 on my self-expression values index. 
After accounting for my measures of socioeconomic, political and traditional cultural 
legacies, Mozambican (b=.100), Madagascan (b=.075), Senegalese (b=.065), Ugandan (b-
=.062), Ghanaian (b=.033) and South African (b=.031) citizens were significantly more likely 
to hold self-expression values. These six countries had the highest mean scores on my index, 
but their overall rankings are different from this order of cultural distinctiveness; the result 
indicates that South Africans are not as different from Batswana as one would expect given 
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the society’s overall values. As previously noted, the two countries have similar 
socioeconomic indicators and, as neighbours, share a degree of cultural tradition. 
Table 5.4: OLS Regression 6. 
 B SE b Adj. R
2 
(block) 
(Constant) -.279 .028   
Modernisation    .009 
Urban -.076 .009 -.069***  
‘White-Collar’ .033 .010 .029**  
Human Development Sequence    .022 
Economic Security .043 .005 .075***  
Employment Status .006 .004 .013  
Age Cohort -.023 .004 -.060***  
Cognitive Learning    .055 
Formal Education .064 .006 .110***  
Cognitive Engagement .072 .005 .111***  
Media Consumption .046 .004 .102***  
Political Learning    .001 
Post-Transition Generation -.033 .012 -.029**  
Traditional Norms    .012 
Traditional Identity -.087 .011 -.059***  
Supports Clientelism -.045 .009 -.037***  
Country    .056 
Benin -.017 .027 -.007  
Ghana .077 .026 .033**  
Kenya -.031 .026 -.014  
Lesotho -.175 .028 -.067***  
Madagascar .167 .026 .075***  
Malawi -.141 .026 -.062***  
Mali -.115 .027 -.048***  
Mozambique .271 .028 .100***  
Namibia -.029 .027 -.011  
Nigeria -.124 .025 -.072***  
Senegal .166 .027 .065***  
South Africa .057 .024 .031*  
Tanzania .047 .026 .020  
Uganda .102 .025 .062***  
Zambia -.011 .027 -.004  
Variance Explained (R
2
) .122 
.120 
 
Adjusted R
2
  
N=16,056       Outcome Variable = Self-Expression Values Index            *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
National-Level Analysis 
Inglehart’s body of literature generally aggregates data to the societal level as well, 
which has drawn criticism that this methodology creates an ‘ecological fallacy’ because it 
uses individual-level, survey data to form a macro-level theory regarding global cultural 
change (cf. Seligson, 2002). However, Inglehart and Welzel (2003) counters that aggregating 
data cancels out random measurement error, thus providing more valid results, and 
demonstrates that the WVS’ micro-level findings were largely replicated after aggregation. 
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My final analysis contrasts Afrobarometer nations according to their aggregate indicators to 
corroborate my findings in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. To test the modernisation argument, I 
employed each nation’s urban population and service sector employment as a proportion of 
total population and employment, respectively. I employed both human development (HDI) 
and national income (GNI per capita) to test the HDS, while each country’s literacy rate and 
mean years of schooling for adults over the age of 25 represented cognitive factors. Finally, I 
employed Freedom House scores and the number of years elapsed since each country’s most 
recent democratic transition to evaluate political learning. 
Table 5.5: Correlates of Self-Expressive Orientations49 
 PMV Wellbeing Tolerance Activism Trust SEV Index 
Modernisation       
Urban Population  .463 .298 .268 -.539 -.362 .184 
Service Employment .110 .374 .110 -.423 -.255 .024 
HDS       
HDI .384 .309 .253 -.160 -.443 .222 
GNI per capita .331 .251 .161 -.247 -.298 .190 
Cognitive Hypothesis       
Years Schooling .309 .059 .095 .085 -.311 .181 
Literacy Rate .316 .017 .097 .354 -.522 .066 
Political Learning       
Multiparty Experience .161 .012 -.037 -.188 .038 .064 
Freedom House .313 .044 .145 -.401 -.218 -.008 
N=17.                               Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index. 
 Firstly, I conducted a series of bivariate correlations to test the relationship between 
each predictor variable and both my self-expression values scale and its cultural sub-
dimensions (Table 5.5, above). My analysis demonstrates that the explanatory models had 
the predicted, positive association with post-materialist values, subjective wellbeing, and 
tolerance, but were (surprisingly) negatively correlated with political activism and 
interpersonal trust. Perhaps as a result of these mixed results, the correlations between these 
objective measures and the overall index were weak; however, all but the Freedom House 
variable had the expected, positive effect. Of the eight measures, countries’ HDI levels had 
                                                 
49
 Values are bivariate Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r); significance statistics are not reported due to the 
small sample size (N=17). Cohen (1977) suggests the following guidelines for evaluating effect sizes: .20 is a 
small effect, .50 is moderate, and .80 large. Correlations of .80 are rare in the social sciences; therefore this 
table highlights the magnitude and direction of coefficients (r>.250).  
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the strongest effect on self-expression values (r=.222), followed by GNI per capita (r=.190), 
urbanisation (r=.184), and the average years of formal education within each society 
(r=.181). These findings therefore corroborate my previous finding that socioeconomic 
factors have the most significant effect on Africans’ value preferences.  
Finally, I conducted a regression model to evaluate which of these variables explained 
the cross-national variation in self-expression values. Model 7 indicates that countries’ 
human development levels were the most powerful predictor of the society’s score on my 
self-expression values index by a substantial margin—accounting for just under 5% of the 
total variance in value preferences (Table 5.6, below). This contradicts the individual-level 
analysis, but corroborates global WVS evidence; thus indicating that further investigation is 
required into the link between development and aggregate culture in the region. The result 
that the mean years of schooling in a country had a negative effect on self-expression values 
is particularly surprising given the results on the individual level. 
Table 5.6: OLS Regression 7 (Aggregated Afrobarometer Data)50 
 B b 
(Constant) -.530  
Modernisation   
Urban Population  .008 .818 
Service Employment -.008 -1.026 
HDS   
HDI 2.832 2.089 
GNI per capita .000 .155 
Cognitive Hypothesis   
Years Schooling -.094 -1.539 
Literacy Rate .001 .163 
Political Learning   
Multiparty Experience -.005 -.336 
Freedom House -.032 -.488 
Total Variance Explained (R
2
) .432 
N=17.                               Outcome Variable=Self-Expression Values Index. 
Conclusion 
This chapter employed my fifteen-item self-expression values index to make a series 
of comparisons between: individual Africans; my measure and Inglehart’s survival/self-
                                                 
50
 I do not report significance figures due to the small sample size (N=17); the table highlights the magnitude 
and direction of coefficients (b>.250). 
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expression values index; various theories of cultural change; and, finally, between Batswana 
and other Africans. According my scale, Afrobarometer countries form a relatively coherent 
cultural zone: the range in national scores was 0.4 points, which is smaller than that found in 
the fifth WVS wave (1.64 points; Table A.6). Secondly, my analysis further indicates that my 
fifteen-item self-expression values index overestimates the proportion of emancipative values 
relative to Inglehart’s scale: on average, my results were 0.19 points higher than the WVS’ 
findings in Afrobaromter countries. Thirdly, both the HDS and cognitive hypotheses explain 
large proportions of the total variance in individual Africans’ value preferences, but cognitive 
autonomy had a larger effect. National level cultural variation, conversely, was driven by 
human development levels, which had the expected (positive) impact on forming self-
expression values. Surprisingly, countries’ average education levels had a fairly strong, 
negative effect on self-expression values.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I presented a dual-level approach to the investigation into development 
and democratic culture in Botswana using statistical analysis of survey data from the third 
round of the Afrobarometer study (2005/2006). Firstly, I measured the levels of 
emancipative, ‘self-expression’ values in the country and tested four predictive models 
linking development to individual-level cultural change: modernisation theory, the Human 
Development Sequence, cognitive learning, and political learning. Secondly, I replicated the 
analysis for the full Afrobarometer dataset in order to investigate the extent to which 
Africans’ values are shaped by collective experience. In contrast to my expectations, 
however, my results indicate that Botswana is at a middling point on the survival/self-
expression value spectrum and is not, on average, more self-expressive than the region.  
After adapting Ronald Inglehart’s survival/self-expression values index for 
operationalisation within existing Afrobarometer data, my results demonstrated that 
Batswana were fairly evenly divided between support for communal, ‘survival’ values and 
emancipative, ‘self-expression’ values. Statistical analysis indicated that there was substantial 
cultural variation within the country, which was largely driven by micro-level differences in 
existential security and cognition—although being socialised under multiparty rule also had a 
modest impact on forming self-expression values. The analysis further demonstrated that 
traditional, communal values continue to shape Batswana’s attitudes, which may explain why 
the societal mean score is lower on my survival/self-expression values scale than I had 
anticipated. Further analysis at the cross-national level indicated that the national political 
culture is not significantly different from those in other African countries—even when 
controlling for the effect of traditional norms. This surprising result may be the result of 
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conceptual or methodological issues within my study, but may, alternatively, be indicative of 
substantive issues.  
Methodological Explanations 
Firstly, my findings may be the result of employing micro-level data to draw 
conclusions about Botswana’s national political culture (cf. Seligson, 2002). However, the 
macro-level link between socioeconomic development and cultural change has been 
confirmed at the micro-level in the WVS dataset (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). Moreover, one 
would expect that indications of societal-level cultural change occur only once a nation 
achieves a certain threshold on the level of individual citizens; therefore the result may 
indicate that the country has not yet reached this level, rather than a methodological 
shortcoming. 
Secondly, my results may be an indication that my fifteen-item self-expression values 
index is not an accurate representation of Inglehart’s survival/self-expression values index 
using Afrobarometer survey items. Inglehart and Welzel (2010) more recently states that his 
index has been modified into a twelve-item additive scale; future studies could therefore 
employ this newer measure to investigate whether my unexpected results were due to 
measurement problems. Alternatively, one could systematically compare my results to those 
in the WVS dataset for countries included in both surveys. My first recommendation would 
therefore be that the WVS includes Botswana in future waves to make the current database 
more representative of the variation in Africans nations’ socioeconomic development 
trajectories. At present, Mauritius is not included in the dataset either—despite being the 
other notable case of successful political development on the continent.  I would also suggest 
that the Afrobarometer survey continue to include its items on national priorities and 
reintroduce measures of social tolerance in order to allow for the inclusion of more cases—
and ultimately, longitudinal research design. 
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Thirdly, structural equation modelling (SEM) would more accurately reflect the 
socialisation hypothesis’ argument that past socioeconomic conditions influence current 
values than my present methodology. Furthermore, the technique would allow further 
investigation into the interaction between predictor variables in order to test whether 
cognitive autonomy drives value change, or is a reflection of environmental factors. Future 
research employing this technique would therefore allow for policy recommendations, as its 
results would indicate the extent to which civic education programmes could supplement 
raising overall development levels in promoting the country’s democratic consolidation. 
Comparing educated and middle-class citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa would be particularly 
significant as it would provide greater insight into the interaction between existential security 
and cognitive autonomy. 
Substantive Explanations 
Alternatively, my findings may be an indication that Botswana’s society is not as 
different from those of other African countries as the aggregate picture suggests on the level 
of individual citizens. As previously mentioned, Botswana’s idiosyncratic developmental 
path is notable not only for its comparative success in the region, but also for diverging from 
the pattern established by Western, post-industrial societies. Rather than progressing first 
from an agrarian to industrial and only then to a service-oriented economy, as in most 
industrialised countries, the country appears to have bypassed the industrialisation process 
and the majority of the workforce is employed in the service sector and the industrial sector 
remains weak (with the exclusion of the diamond industry). This reality is largely due to 
South Africa’s position as the dominant industrial economy within Southern African region 
and the inability of smaller countries, like Botswana, to compete—despite continued efforts.  
The predominance of service sector employment is a key indicator of the post-
industrialisation process, however, this is concentrated in Botswana’s public sector and 
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progress towards economic diversification remains slow. This lack of a developed private 
sector is vastly different from the situation in mature, developed economies and the narrow 
scope of employment opportunities for an increasingly educated citizenry is likely to have 
important implications for the growth of self-expression values in Botswana. National levels 
of poverty and structural unemployment are another major similarity to other African 
economies—particularly their implication for young citizens. The current generation of 
Batswana youth faces an increasingly precarious future due to the state’s retreat from the 
dominant economic role it has traditionally played and it is unclear whether future 
generations of Batswana will necessarily live in a more secure environment than their 
predecessors given the lack of a vibrant private sector to offset this change. Despite objective 
data clearly indicating that Batswana are living in better material conditions than their 
predecessors, my findings demonstrate that this has not translated into greater levels of 
perceived material security—even prior to the current global economic climate (cf. Figure 
3.3 and Table 3.2).  
In sum, my results disputes long-held assumptions about Botswana’s regional 
singularity, while highlighting major cultural divergences from the country’s traditional, pre-
independence past. My analysis consequently indicates that Botswana is likely to become 
increasingly self-expressive as long as the country continues to develop an educated, 
professional middle class into future generations. It is crucial, however, that policy efforts are 
directed towards attaining both existential and cognitive security independently from 
government efforts—both the HDS and cognitive theories highlight the importance of 
individual autonomy in forming emancipative, self-expression values. It is therefore unlikely 
that the country will reach the levels of these cultural norms associated with democratic 
consolidation until the state plays a smaller role in Batswana’s daily lives.  
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APPENDIX A 
Figure A.1: Botswana’s GNI per capita (current US Dollars, Atlas Method), 1966-2011.  
 
 
Source: World Bank (2012a) 
 
Figure A.2: Comparative Human Development Index (HDI), 1980-2011.  
 
 
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2012) 
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Table A.1: Botswana’s Employment and National Income Distribution by Economic Sector, 1985-2006.  
 
 
1985 1990 1996 2000 2005 2010 
% of Total GDP       
Agriculture 6.4 4.9 4.0 2.7 1.8 2.9 
Industry 61.2 61.0 53.2 52.6 50.6 45.3 
Services 32.4 34.1 42.8 44.7 47.6 51.9 
% of Total Employment       
Agriculture 57.9 - 15.6 19.7 29.9 - 
Industry 10.6 - 25.6 20.9 15.2 - 
Services 31.4 - 58.6 58.1 54.7 - 
NB: Employment statistics were not available for 1990 and 2010. 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
  
Table A.2: Botswana’s Population Characteristics, 1971-2001. 
 
 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Enumerated Population  574,094 941,027 1,326,796 1,680,863 
Male  262,121 443,104 634,400 813,583 
Female  311,973 497,923 692,396 867,280 
Non-Batswana  10,861 15,677 29,557 60,716 
Botswana Nationals Abroad  45,735 42,069 38,606 28,210 
Male (000's)  36,7 32,6 27,9 16,8 
Female (000's)  9,1 9,4 10,7 11,4 
Population Distribution (%) 
0-4  17.6 18.8 14.6 11.6 
5-14  29.9 28.8 28.6 25 
15-64  46.9 47.6 51.8 58.2 
15-49  39.4 40.8 45.5 52.0 
65+  5.6 5.1 4.9 5 
Percentage of Females aged 15-49 (out of total females)  42.8 42.9 46.5 52.4 
Dependency Ratio (per 100)  113 110 93 71.5 
Child-woman Ratio (per 1000)  759 819 602 430.1 
Sex Ratio (Males per 100 Females)  84 89 92 93.8 
Percentage Urban  9 17.7 45.7 54.2 
Population Density (per km)  1 1.6 2.3 2.9 
Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000)  45.3 47.7 39.3 28.9 
Crude Death Rate (per 1,000)  13.7 13.9 11.5 12.4 
Natural Rate of Increase (% per annum)  3.1 3.4 2.7 1.7 
General Fertility Rate (per 1,000 women aged 15-49)  189 210 161 106.9 
Mean age at childbearing  30.5 30.6 30 30.3 
Total Fertility Rate (births per woman)  6.5 6.6 4.2 3.27 
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births) 97 71 48 56 
Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 56 35 16 19 
Under 5 Mortality (per 1,000) 152 105 63 74 
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)  55.5 56.5 65.3 55.6 
Males  52.5 52.3 63.3 52.0 
Females  58.6 59.7 67.1 57.4 
Mean Age (years)  23.4 22.7 23 24.8 
Males  22.6 22.0 22.4 24.2 
Females  24.1 23.4 23.5 25.3 
Median Age (Years)  15.0 15.3 16.8 20.1 
Males  13.5 15.0 16.0 19.4 
Females  16.7 16.5 17.4 20.8 
Population Growth Rate  - 4.7 3.5 2.4 
Source: Central Statistics Office (2003). 
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Table A.3: Age-Specific Adult Literacy Rate (%), 2003. 
 
Age Group Male Female Total 
15-19 92.5 94.9 93.7 
20-24 91.6 96.4 94.2 
25-29 89.3 95.4 92.6 
30-34 85.9 88.4 87.3 
35-39 79.1 84.3 82.1 
40-44 68.9 72.8 71.1 
45-49 64.3 63.8 64.0 
50-54 59.6 53.5 56.3 
55-59 54.2 48.7 51.0 
60-64 36.5 34.8 35.5 
65+ 36.3 26.8 30.9 
Total 80.4 81.8 81.2 
Source: Central Statistics Office (2005:77)  
 
Figure A.3: Urban Population, 1960-2010. 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
 
Table A.4: Voter Turnout in Botswana, 1965-2009. 
 
Year Population 
Voting Age 
Population 
(VAP) 
Registration 
Registration 
by VAP (%) 
Total Vote 
Turnout 
Vote/Reg. 
(%) 
VAP 
Turnout 
(%) 
1965 520,000 202,800 188,950 93.17 140,858 75.55 69.42 
1969 570,000 205,200 140,428 68.43 76,858 54.73 37.46 
1974 660,000 244,200 205,050 83.97 64,011 31.22 26.21 
1979 783,873 290,033 230,231 79.38 134,496 58.42 46.37 
1984 1,051,000 420,400 293,571 69.83 227,756 77.58 54.18 
1989 1,245,000 522,900 367,069 70.20 250,487 68.24 47.90 
1994 1,443,000 634,920 370,173 58.30 283,375 76.55 44.63 
1999 1,592,528 844,338 459,662 54.44 354,466 77.11 41.98 
2004 1,561,973 957,540 552,849 57.74 421,272 76.2 44.00 
2009 1,990,876 892,339 723,617 81.09 555,078 76.71 62.20 
Source: International IDEA (2012)  
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Table A.5: Economic Status by Age, 2006. 
 
Age Group Employed Unemployed 
Economically 
Active 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
15-19 29,577 10,749 40,326 26.7 
20-24 68,360 36,663 105,023 34.9 
25-29 83,111 24,801 107,912 23.0 
30-34 77,214 13,256 90,470 14.7 
35-39 64,544 9,670 74,215 13.0 
40-44 51,910 7,023 58,933 11.9 
45-49 46,637 5,194 51,832 10.0 
50-54 34,954 3,341 38,296 8.7 
55-59 23,404 1,517 24,920 6.1 
60-64 14,459 859 15,318 5.6 
65+ 32,148 923 33,071 2.8 
Total 539,150 114,042 653,191 17.5 
Source: Central Statistics Office (2011: 83), taken from the Labour Force Survey 2005/2006. 
 
Table A.6: Societal Goals and Individuals’ Values  
 
 Traditional Society Modern Society Postmodern Society 
Core Societal Goal 
Survival in a steady-state 
economy. 
Maximise economic 
growth. 
Maximise subjective 
well-being 
Individual Values 
Traditional religious and 
communal norms. 
Secular-rational and 
survival values. 
Self-expression values. 
Authority System Traditional authority. Rational-legal authority. 
De-emphasis of both 
legal and religious 
authority. 
Source: Adapted from Inglehart (1997: 76; Table 3.1) and Inglehart (1999). 
 
Figure A.4: World Values Survey Global Cultural Map, 1999-2004. 
 
Source: World Values Survey (2012) 
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Figure A.5: World Values Survey Global Cultural Map, 2005-2007.
 
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2010) 
 
Figure A.6: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 
 
 
Source: Hagerty (1999: 250) 
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Table A.7: Self-Expression Values in Medium-Development Countries 
  
Country 
World Values Survey Human Development (2011) National Income (2011) 
Wave 
Surv/Self. 
Values 
HDI Rank HDI 
GNI per 
capita 
Income 
Group 
El Salvador 4 .53 105 .674 3,480 Lower-Middle 
Thailand 5 .01 103 .682 4,420 Upper-Middle 
South Africa 5 -.10 123 .619 6,960 Upper-Middle 
Philippines 4 -.11 112 .644 2,210 Lower-Middle 
Guatemala 4 -.17 131 .574 2,870 Lower-Middle 
Botswana Prediction -.20 118 .633 7,480 Upper-Middle 
India 5 -.21 134 .547 1,410 Lower-Middle 
Vietnam 5 -.26 128 .510 1,260 Lower-Middle 
Ghana 5 -0.29 135 .547 1,410 Lower-Middle 
Egypt 4 -.54 113 .644 2,600 Lower-Middle 
Algeria 4 -.74 96 .698 4,470 Upper-Middle 
Indonesia 5 -.80 124 .617 2,940 Lower-Middle 
Kyrgyzstan 4 -.91 126 .615 920 Low 
Morocco 5 -1.04 130 .582 2,970 Lower-Middle 
Jordan 4 -1.05 95 .698 4,380 Upper-Middle 
China 5 -1.16 101 .687 4,930 Upper-Middle 
Moldova 5 -1.28 111 .649 1,980 Lower-Middle 
NB: All countries were classified as ‘Medium Development’ by the UNDP in 2011. 
Sources: Inglehart & Welzel (2005a), UNDP (2011), World Bank (2012), and World Values Survey (2011). 
 
 
 
Table A.8: Value Preferences in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Country Year Mean Score 
Burkina Faso 2007 -0.49 
Ethiopia  2007 -0.36 
Ghana 2007 -0.29 
Mali 2007 -0.08 
Nigeria 
1990 
1995 
2000 
-0.68 
-0.68 
0.28 
Rwanda 2007 -0.62 
South Africa 
1990 
1996 
2001 
2007 
-0.46 
-0.46 
-0.10 
-0.10 
Tanzania 2001 -0.15 
Uganda 2001 -0.50 
Zambia 2007 -0.62 
Zimbabwe 2001 -1.36 
Source: World Values Survey (2011) 
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Table A.9: Comparative Development Measures in Afrobarometer Countries 
 
Country HDI 
GNI  
per capita 
Employed in 
Services (%) 
Urban  
Pop. (%) 
Literacy 
Rate 
Multiparty 
Transition 
Freedom 
House 
Benin .409 570 46.2 40.0 41.7 1990 10 
Botswana .601 5,070 54.7 57.3 84.1 1966 10 
Cape Verde .543 2,080 n/a 57.4 84.8 1991 12 
Ghana .484 460 29.1 47.8 66.6 1992 11 
Kenya .467 520 32.2 20.7 87 1992 8 
Lesotho .417 840 18.3 23.3 89.7 1993 9 
Madagascar .465 300 15.8 28.5 64.5 1993 8 
Malawi .351 220 n/a 17.3 73.7 1994 6 
Mali .319 390 28.3 30.5 26.2 1992 10 
Mozambique .285 300 16.1 34.5 55.1 1994 7 
Namibia .593 3,300 55.1 35.1 88.5 1989 10 
Nigeria .429 630 41.1 46.2 60.8 1999 6 
Senegal .432 800 36.1 41.6 49.7 1978 9 
South Africa .599 4,850 66.6 59.3 88.7 1994 11 
Tanzania .420 380 19.2 24.2 72.9 1990 7 
Uganda .401 300 23.2 12.5 71.4 2005 5 
Zambia .394 500 20.6 35.0 70.9 1991 6 
Zimbabwe .345 440 15.3 35.9 91.9 2000 1 
NB: Freedom House score is a reversed additive index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties that has been recoded 
so that the worst score (7 on both) is a 0 and the best score (1 on both) is a 12. 
Sources: World Bank (2012), UNDP (2012), and Freedom House (2012).
51
 
 
Table A.10: Scarcity v. ‘Well being’ Values. 
 
Scarcity Values ‘Well-being’ Values 
Not happy Life satisfaction 
Woman needs children Post-materialist values (scale) 
Reject out groups (scale) Affect balance (scale) 
State/employee management In good health 
Child needs both parents Homosexuals ok 
Technology Friends important 
Respect parents Trust people 
Hard work Leisure important 
State responsible Imagination  
Money Women’s movement 
Trust science Tolerance 
Jobs to own nationality Equality 
Good and evil are clear Have free choice 
Respect authority  
Source: Inglehart (1997: 82, Fig 3.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
51
 Note: HDI, GNI per capita, urban population and Freedom House scores are all for 2005. Adult literacy rates (at least 
fifteen years old) for 2009, except Mozambique (2006), Uganda (2006) and South Africa (2007). GNI per capita is in 
current (i.e. 2012) US dollars). Proportion of services employment is for the closest available figure to 2005.  
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Table A.11: Measuring Cross-Dimensional Value Preferences. 
 
Traditional values emphasise the following (Secular-Rational values emphasise the opposite): Agg. Indiv. 
God is very important. .91 .70 
It is more important to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and 
determination (Autonomy Index). 
.88 .61 
Abortion is never justifiable. .82 .61 
Strong sense of national pride. .81 .60 
Favours more respect for authority .73 .51 
Survival values emphasise the following (Self-expression emphasise the opposite): Agg. Indiv. 
Priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life (4-item 
Materialist/PMV Index). 
.87 .59 
Describes self as not very happy. .81 .59 
Homosexuality is never justifiable. .77 .58 
Has not and would not sign a petition. .74 .54 
Wary of trusting people. .46 .44 
NB: Factor loadings based on the first four waves of the WVS. 
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 49-51). 
Table A.12: Correlates of Survival vs. Self-Expression Values. 
 
Survival values emphasize the following (opposite of self-expression values) r 
Men make better political leaders than women. .86 
Respondent is dissatisfied with financial situation of his or her household. .83 
A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled. .83 
Respondent rejects foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbours. .81 
Respondent favours more emphasis on the development of technology. .78 
Respondent has not recycled things to protect the environment. .78 
Respondent has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the environment .75 
When seeking a job, a good income and a safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and 
working with the people you like. 
.74 
Respondent is relatively favourable to state ownership of business and industry. .74 
A child needs a home with both a mother and a father to grow up happily. .73 
Respondent does not describe own health as very good. .73 
One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behaviour. .71 
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women. .69 
Prostitution is never justifiable. .69 
Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. .68 
Respondent does not have much free choice or control over his or her life. .67 
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl. .67 
Respondent does not favour less emphasis on money and material possessions. .66 
Respondent rejects people with criminal records as neighbours. .65 
Respondent rejects heavy drinkers as neighbours. .65 
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child. .64 
Imagination is not one of the most important things to teach a child. .62 
Tolerance and respect for others are not the most important things to teach a child.  .62 
Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity. .60 
Leisure is not very important in life. .60 
Friends are not very important in life. .58 
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections would be a good form of 
government. 
.56 
Respondent has not and would not take part in a boycott. .56 
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased. .55 
Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government. .45 
Respondent opposes sending economic aid to poorer countries. .42 
Source: Inglehart & Welzel (2005b: 55-56) 
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Table A.13: Materialist v. Post-Materialist Values Index. 
 
For a nation, it is not always possible to obtain everything one might wish….  
Set One  Maintaining order in the nation. 
 Giving the people more say in important political decisions.* 
 Fighting rising prices. 
 Protecting freedom of speech.* 
Set Two 
 
 
 Maintaining a high level of economic growth. 
 Making sure this country has strong defence forces. 
 Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done in their jobs and in their communities.* 
 Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.* 
Set Three 
 
 
 A stable economy. 
 Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.* 
 Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.* 
 The fight against crime. 
NB: *Post-materialist response. Set One constitutes the Four-Item Index.  
Source: Davis and Davenport (1999:650-651) 
 
 
 
Table A.14: Emancipative Values Index. 
 
Indicator 
Factor 
Loading 
Equality over Patriarchy: 
 Agree that a woman can live by herself. 
 Disagree that men make better political leaders. 
 Disagree that education is more important for boys. 
 Disagree that men have more right to a job. 
.76 
Tolerance over Conformity: 
 Agree that abortion can be justified. 
 Agree that homosexuality is justified. 
 Agree that divorce is justified. 
.72 
Autonomy over Authority: 
 Autonomy chosen as a goal to teach. 
 Imagination chosen as a goal to teach. 
 Obedience not chosen as a goal to teach. 
 Faith not chosen as a goal to teach. 
.63 
Expression over Security: 
 Priority to giving people more say in government over order and stable prices. 
 Priority to giving people more say in local affairs over strong defence and fighting crime. 
 Priority to protecting freedom of speech over order and stable prices. 
.54 
Source: Welzel and Inglehart (2009: 130)  
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Table A.15: Global Value Preferences (WVS Wave 5). 
 
Rank Country 
Surv/Self 
Values 
1 Sweden  2.35
52
 
2 Norway  2.17 
3 Canada  1.91 
4 Switzerland  1.90 
5 New Zealand  1.86 
6 United States of America  1.76 
7 Australia  1.75 
8 Britain  1.68 
9 Andorra  1.62 
10 France  1.13 
11 Finland  1.12 
12 Mexico  1.03 
13 Uruguay  0.99 
14 West Germany  0.74 
15 Brazil  0.61 
16 Colombia  0.60 
17 Italy  0.60 
18 Spain  0.54 
19 Argentina  0.38 
20 Slovenia  0.36 
21 East Germany  0.26 
22 Cyprus  0.13 
23 Malaysia  0.09 
24 Thailand  0.01 
25 Chile  0.00 
26 Japan  -0.05 
27 Mali  -0.08 
28 South Africa  -0.10 
29 Poland  -0.14 
30 India  -0.21 
31 Trinidad  -0.26 
32 Vietnam  -0.26 
33 Ghana  -0.29 
34 Turkey  -0.33 
35 Ethiopia  -0.36 
36 Burkina Faso  -0.49 
37 Rwanda  -0.62 
38 Serbia  -0.62 
39 Zambia  -0.62 
40 Indonesia  -0.80 
41 Ukraine  -0.83 
42 Hong Kong  -0.98 
43 Bulgaria  -1.01 
44 Morocco  -1.04 
45 China  -1.16 
46 Taiwan  -1.18 
47 Moldova  -1.28 
48 South Korea  -1.37 
49 Russia  -1.42 
50 Romania  -1.55 
51 Iraq  -1.68 
Source: World Values Survey (2011). 
                                                 
52
 Inglehart and Welzel (2010: 564, footnote 10) states that the survival/self-expression index is now an additive index 
of twelve items and reconfigures the scale from -2.0 to 3.0, but does not explain these changes.  
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APPENDIX B  
SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES INDEX FORMATION 
 
Variable Afrobarometer Survey Item Afrobarometer Coding Thesis Coding 
Indicator 1: Value Orientation 
Individualism Q19 A: People should look after 
themselves and be responsible for 
their own success in life. 
B: The government should bear the 
main responsibility for the well-being 
of people. 
Agree very strongly with A 
Agree with A 
Agree with B 
Agree very strongly with B 
Agree with neither 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Individualist 
Individualist 
Communitarian 
Communitarian 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
-1.5 
0 
999 
999 
999 
Critical 
citizenship 
Q20 A: As citizens, we should be 
more active in questioning the actions 
of our leaders. 
B: In our country these days, we 
should show more respect for 
authority. 
Agree very strongly with A 
Agree with A 
Agree with B 
Agree very strongly with B 
Agree with neither 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Critical 
Critical 
Uncritical 
Uncritical 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
-1.5 
0 
999 
999 
999 
Associational 
autonomy 
Q25 A: Government should be able to 
ban any organization that goes against 
its policies. 
B: We should be able to join any 
organisation, whether or not the 
government approves of it. 
Agree very strongly with A 
Agree with A 
Agree with B 
Agree very strongly with B 
Agree with neither 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Anti 
Anti 
Pro 
Pro 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
-1.5 
-1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
0 
999 
999 
999 
Press freedom Q26 A: Government should close 
newspapers that print false stories or 
misinformation. 
B: The news media should be free to 
publish any story that they see fit 
without fear of being shut down. 
Agree very strongly with A 
Agree with A 
Agree with B 
Agree very strongly with B 
Agree with neither 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Anti 
Anti 
Pro 
Pro 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
-1.5 
-1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
0 
999 
999 
999 
Freedom of 
expression 
Q27 A: Government should not allow 
the expression of political views that 
are fundamentally different from the 
views of the majority. 
B: People should be able to speak 
their minds about politics free of 
government influence, no matter how 
unpopular their views may be. 
Agree very strongly with A 
Agree with A 
Agree with B 
Agree very strongly with B 
Agree with neither 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Anti 
Anti 
Pro 
Pro 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
-1.5 
-1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
0 
999 
999 
999 
Indicator 2: Subjective Wellbeing 
Present 
wellbeing. 
Q4B In general, how would you 
describe: Your own present living 
conditions? 
Very bad 
Fairly bad 
Neither good nor bad 
Fairly good 
Very good 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Very low 
Low 
Neutral 
High 
Very high 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
999 
999 
Past 
wellbeing. 
Q5 Looking back, how do you rate 
the following compared to twelve 
months ago: Your living conditions? 
Much worse 
Worse 
Same 
Better 
Much better 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
Very low 
Low 
Neutral 
High 
Very high 
Neutral 
Missing data 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
999 
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Missing data -1 Missing data 999 
Expected 
wellbeing. 
Q6B Looking ahead, do you expect 
the following to be better or worse: 
Your living conditions in twelve 
months’ time? 
Much worse 
Worse 
Same 
Better 
Much better 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Very low 
Low 
Neutral 
High 
Very high 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
999 
999 
Overall 
subjective 
wellbeing. 
Average of present, past and expected 
wellbeing. 
    
Indicator 3: Social Tolerance 
Equal rights 
for women. 
Q23 A: In our country, women should 
have equal rights and receive the 
same treatment as men do. 
B: Women have always been subject 
to traditional laws and customs, and 
should remain so. 
Agree very strongly with A 
Agree with A 
Agree with B 
Agree very strongly with B 
Agree with neither 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Pro 
Pro 
Anti 
Anti 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
-1.5 
0 
999 
999 
999 
Equal 
opportunity 
for women. 
Q24 A: Women should have the same 
chance of being elected to political 
office as men. 
B: Men make better political leaders 
than women, and should be elected 
rather than women. 
Agree very strongly with A 
Agree with A 
Agree with B 
Agree very strongly with B 
Agree with neither 
Don’t know 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
998 
-1 
Pro 
Pro 
Anti 
Anti 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
-1.5 
0 
999 
999 
999 
Indicator 4: Political Activism 
Protest 
potential. 
Q31B Here is a list of actions that 
people sometimes take as citizens. 
For each of these, please tell me 
whether you, personally, have done 
any of these things during the past 
year. If not, would you do this if you 
had the chance: Got together with 
others to raise an issue? 
Yes, often. 
Yes, several times. 
Yes, once or twice. 
No, would if had the chance. 
No, would never do this. 
Don’t know. 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
9 
998 
-1 
Activist 
Activist 
Activist 
Potential Activ. 
Non-Activist 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
999 
999 
999 
Contact local 
government 
councillor. 
Q32A During the past year, how often 
have you contacted any of the 
following persons about some 
important problem or to give them 
your views: A local government 
councilor? 
Often. 
A few times. 
Only once. 
Never. 
Don’t know. 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
3 
2 
1 
0 
9 
998 
-1 
Activist 
Activist 
Activist 
Non-Activist 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
999 
999 
999 
Contact MP. Q32B During the past year, how often 
have you contacted any of the 
following persons about some 
important problem or to give them 
your views: A Parliamentarian? 
Often. 
A few times. 
Only once. 
Never. 
Don’t know. 
Refused to answer 
Missing data 
3 
2 
1 
0 
9 
998 
-1 
Activist 
Activist 
Activist 
Non-Activist 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
999 
999 
999 
Contact 
ministry 
official. 
Q32C During the past year, how 
often have you contacted any of the 
following persons about some 
important problem or to give them 
your views: An official of a 
government ministry? 
Often. 
A few times. 
Only once. 
Never. 
Don’t know. 
Refused to answer. 
Missing data. 
3 
2 
1 
0 
9 
998 
-1 
Activist 
Activist 
Activist 
Non-Activist 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
999 
999 
999 
Contact party 
official. 
Q32D During the past year, how 
often have you contacted any of the 
following persons about some 
important problem or to give them 
Often. 
A few times. 
Only once. 
Never. 
3 
2 
1 
0 
Activist 
Activist 
Activist 
Non-Activist 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
-1.5 
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your views: A political party official? Don’t know. 
Refused to answer. 
Missing data. 
9 
998 
-1 
Missing data 
Missing data 
Missing data 
999 
999 
999 
Indicator 5: Interpersonal Trust 
Standard trust 
question. 
Q83 Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or 
that you must be very careful in 
dealing with people? 
You must be very careful. 
Most people can be trusted 
Don’t know. 
Refused to answer. 
Missing data. 
0 
1 
9 
998 
-1 
Low 
High 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
-1.5 
1.5 
0 
999 
999 
Trust in ‘non 
co-ethnics’. 
Q84D How much do you trust each of 
the following types of people: 
Batswana from other ethnic groups? 
Not at all. 
Just a little. 
I trust them somewhat. 
I trust them a lot. 
Don’t know. 
Refused to answer. 
Missing data. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
9 
998 
-1 
Very Low 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
Neutral 
Missing data 
Missing data 
-2 
-1 
1 
2 
0 
999 
999 
Self-Expression Values 
SEV Index53 Additive scale – all five indicators 
weighted equally from -2.0 to 2.0. 
    
 
                                                 
53
 The initial Self-Expression Values (SEV) Index is an additive scale of all seventeen measures, with each indicator weighted 
equally and coded from -2.0 (survivalist) to 2.0 (self-expressive). The revised 12-item SEV Index excluded the measures for 
Individualism, Critical Citizenship, Protest Potential and both measures of Interpersonal Trust following exploratory factor 
analysis (cf. Chapter 3).  
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APPENDIX C 
SECTION 1: BOTSWANA 
Self-Expression Value Preferences 
 
Value Orientation Pro Neutral Anti Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Individualism 49.6 7.8 42.4 (.3) .05 
Critical citizenship 77.3 2.6 19.7 (.5) .20 
Freedom of association 70.8 2.5 25.1 (1.7) .60 
Freedom of the press 70.9 3.0 24.7 (1.4) .65 
Freedom of expression 82.2 1.3 15.5 (1.0) .48 
N=1,153 
Factor analysis was specified to extract a single factor (Eigenvalues=1.06), which explains 21.1% of 
the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.47) is fairly low and indicated that  both 
the Individualism and Critical citizenship items should be dropped. 
 
Value Orientation (revised) Pro Neutral Anti Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Freedom of association 70.8 2.5 25.1 (1.7) .62 
Freedom of the press 70.9 3.0 24.7 (1.4) .65 
Freedom of expression 82.2 1.3 15.5 (1.0) .47 
N=1,159 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.02), which explains 33.9% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.60) is acceptable for an index of value 
orientations. 
 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.06), which explains 35.3% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.62) is acceptable for an index of subjective 
wellbeing. 
 
Social Tolerance Pro Neutral Anti Missing 
Equal rights for both sexes 67.3 2.7 29.4 (.6) 
Equal political opportunity 82.6 1.5 15.3 (.6) 
N=1,188. 
The two items are correlated (Pearson’s r=.42) and reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha=.59) enough to 
warrant an average construct of social tolerance. 
 
Political Activism Activist 
Non-
Activist 
Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Raise an issue with others 90.5 8.9 (.6) .24 
Contact local councillor 25.9 74.1 (0) .62 
Contact Member of Parliament 11.6 88.4 (0) .64 
Contact ministry official 13.3 86.6 (.1) .57 
Contact political party official 11.8 88.3 (0) .68 
N=1,192 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=2.24), which explains 32.5% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.67) is acceptable for an index of political 
activism.  
Subjective Wellbeing 
Very 
High 
High Neutral Low 
Very 
Low 
Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Present wellbeing 1.6 18.3 18.9 36.8 24.4 (0) .59 
Past wellbeing 3.7 23.9 41.1 21.8 9.5 (0) .56 
Expected wellbeing 9.5 34.4 30.6 15.8 9.8 (0) .63 
N=1,200. 
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The two items are very weakly correlated (Pearson’s r=.12) and unreliable (Cronbach’s Alpha=.17), 
thus calling into question whether one can use an average construct of the two. I chose to keep both, 
however, as there was a significant drop in the Standardised Trust Question between R1 and R3. 
 
Self-Expressive Value Preferences in Botswana (1999-2008)  
Survey Item 
Percentage  
1999 2003 2005 2008 Avg. 
People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own 
success in life. 
48.1 47.9 49.5 - 48.5 
As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of 
our leaders. 
- 62.1 77.2 66.5 68.6 
We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the 
government approves of it. 
- - 70.8 62.4 66.6 
The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit 
without fear of being shut down. 
- - 70.9 79.8 75.4 
People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of 
government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be. 
- - 82.2 86.3 84.3 
Present living conditions are at least ‘fairly good.’ - 25.2 19.9 20.6 21.9 
Present living conditions have improved from 12 months ago. - 28.8 27.6 31.3 29.2 
Expects improved living conditions in 12 months. - 51.8 43.8 57.5 51.0 
In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same 
treatment as men do. 
- 77.7 67.4 - 72.6 
Women should have the same chance of being elected to political 
office as men. 
- - 82.6 - 82.6 
Has or would get together with others to raise an issue. 71.8 86.5 90.5 94.7 85.9 
Contacted local government councillor in past year. - 24.1 25.9 35.3 28.4 
Contacted Member of Parliament in past year. - 14.3 11.6 21.7 15.9 
Contacted official of a government agency in past year. - 17.8 13.4 13.3 14.8 
Contacted political party official in past year. - 16.3 11.8 - 14.1 
Most people can be trusted. 13.9 - 5.9 - 9.9 
Trusts Batswana from other ethnic groups.* - - 35.1 35.2 35.2 
*NB: in R4 this was phrased as trust “other Batswana.” 
 
 
 
  
Interpersonal Trust Very High High Neutral Low Very Low Missing 
Generalised trust - 5.9 0.5 93.6 - (0) 
Trust in non-coethnics 14.9 33.1 1.8 20.2 30.0 (0) 
N=1,200. 
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Factor Analysis of the 15-Item Self-Expression Values Scale (Botswana) 
 
Survey Item 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
1 2 3 4 5 
We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the 
government approves of it. 
.048 -.038 -.021 -.038 .632 
The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit 
without fear of being shut down. 
.047 .010 .038 -.087 .640 
People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of 
government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be. 
.103 .077 -.006 -.076 .471 
Present living conditions are at least ‘fairly good.’ .297 .072 .825 .070 .012 
Present living conditions have improved from 12 months ago. .995 .089 .431 -.089 .129 
Expects improved living conditions in 12 months. .728 .102 .877 .021 .068 
In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same 
treatment as men do. 
.067 .437 .129 .023 -.036 
Women should have the same chance of being elected to political 
office as men. 
-.022 .992 .077 .092 -.046 
Has or would get together with others to raise an issue. -.013 .122 .063 .248 -.110 
Has contacted local government councillor in past year. -.093 -.099 -.025 .610 -.060 
Has contacted Member of Parliament in past year. -.069 -.039 .106 .640 -.092 
Has contacted official of a government agency in past year. -.075 -.077 .061 .564 -.058 
Has contacted political party official in past year. -.045 -.034 .080 .670 -.104 
Most people can be trusted. -.009 -.083 .013 .038 -.044 
Trusts Batswana from other ethnic groups. -.040 .050 .041 .144 -.003 
Eigenvalues 1.65 1.25 1.69 1.67 1.10 
Proportion of Total Variance Explained 11.4 8.8 6.3 10.8 6.7 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Direct Oblimin (oblique) with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Predictor Variables  
 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.94), which explains 38.7% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .75) is acceptable for an index of economic 
security. 
 
 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.25), which explains 41.5% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .63) is acceptable for an index of physical 
security. 
 
  
Economic Security 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low None Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Access: Enough Food 52.2 15.5 19.7 10.0 2.5 (0.0) .62 
Access: Clean Water 63.3 14.4 11.9 8.1 2.3 (0.0) .63 
Access: Medical Care 62.4 16.6 14.0 5.6 1.4 (0.0) .61 
Access: Cooking Fuel 56.7 18.5 15.6 7.5 1.7 (0.0) .71 
Access: Cash Income 38.9 16.5 17.5 10.9 16.2 (0.0) .54 
N=1,179 
Physical Security 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low None Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
No Fear of Crime 64.5 18.0 9.3 4.2 4.0 (0.0) .61 
No Theft 69.3 20.2 7.5 2.4 0.6 (0.0) .83 
No Physical Assault 85.7 10.5 2.4 1.1 0.3 (0.0) .44 
N=1,194 
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Existential Security 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low None Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Economic Security 54.8 16.3 15.7 8.4 4.8 (1.8) .17 
Physical Security 73.2 16.2 6.4 2.6 1.6 (0.5) .99 
Employment Security n/a 20.9 5.3 23.7 50.2 (0.1) .17 
N=1,172 
Factor analysis was specified to extract a single factor (Eigenvalue = 1.06), which explains 35.3% of 
the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .21), however, is not acceptable for an 
index of existential security. 
 
 
Cognitive Engagement High Moderate Low Very Low Missing 
Political Interest 44.6 29.5 14.9 11.0 (0.0) 
Political Discussion n/a 23.0 39.0 38.0 (0.0) 
N=1,185 
The two items are correlated (Pearson’s r=.31) and reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha=.46) enough to 
warrant an average construct of cognitive engagement. 
 
Media Consumption 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very Low Missing 
Factor 
Loading 
Radio news 44.0 32.0 7.1 2.8 14.0 (0.0) .53 
Television news 27.0 16.0 8.3 3.9 44.8 (0.0) .74 
Newspaper news 22.8 25.7 13.8 4.9 32.9 (0.1) .72 
N=1,198 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.34), which explains 44.8% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .70) is acceptable for an index of media 
consumption. 
 
Cognitive Autonomy 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very Low Missing 
Factor 
Loading 
Formal Education - 9.5 45.0 28.2 17.0 (0.3) .60 
Cognitive Engagement - 22.3 26.3 27.0 24.5 (1.3) .36 
Media Consumption 31.3 24.6 9.7 3.9 30.6 (0.2) .89 
N=1,179 
Factor analysis extracted a single un otated factor (Eigenvalue=1.29), which explains 42.9% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.77) is acceptable for a second-order index of 
cognitive development. 
 
Political Learning Pre-Transition Post-Transition Missing 
Political Cohort 15.6 84.4 (0.0) 
N=1,200 
 
 
Traditional Norms Yes No Missing 
Factor 
Loading 
More/Only Attached to Ethnic Identity 12.1 87.9 (0.4) .326 
Supports Clientelism 13.2 86.8 (0.1) .181 
Supports Automatic VP Succession 41.8 58.2 (2.1) -.044 
N=1,169     
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=.141), which explains 4.69% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.018) is not acceptable for an index. 
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SECTION 2: AFROBAROMETER 
 
Self-Expression Value Preferences
54
 
 
Value Orientation Pro Neutral Anti Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Individualism 47.9 3.5 48.7 (6.4) -.05 
Critical citizenship 68.4 2.0 29.6 (7.1) -.06 
Freedom of association 62.7 3.4 33.9 (4.3) .58 
Freedom of the press 57.2 3.7 39.1 (4.7) .50 
Freedom of expression 73.8 2.0 24.2 (3.4) .48 
N=18,542 
Factor analysis was specified to extract one factor (Eigenvalues=.811), which explained 
16.2% of the common variance. As in the national analysis, index reliability (Cronbach’s 
Alpha=.33) was fairly low. 
 
Value Orientation (revised) Pro Neutral Anti Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Freedom of association 62.7 3.4 33.9 (4.3) .59 
Freedom of the press 57.2 3.7 39.1 (4.7) .52 
Freedom of expression 73.8 2.0 24.2 (3.4) .49 
N=19,888 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=.852), which explains 28.4% 
of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.54) is acceptable for an index 
of value orientations. 
 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.13), which explains 37.7% 
of the common variance. Index reliab lity (Cronbach’s Alpha=.64) is acceptable for an index 
of subjective wellbeing. 
 
Social Tolerance Pro Neutral Anti Missing 
Equal rights for both sexes 71.0 1.6 27.4 (6.2) 
Equal political opportunity 75.7 1.2 23.1 (1.0) 
N=20,168 
The two items are correlated (Pearson’s r=.48) and reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha=.64) enough 
to warrant an average construct of social tolerance. 
 
Political Activism Activist Non-Activist Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Raise an issue with others 84.9 15.1 (4.7) .29 
Contact local councillor 25.3 74.7 (4.7) .56 
Contact Member of Parliament 1.5 89.5 (4.7) .64 
Contact ministry official 11.3 88.7 (4.7) .63 
Contact political party official 15.1 2.1 81.5 .66 
N=19,960 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.65), which explains 32.7% 
of the common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.68) is acceptable for an index 
of political activism. 
 
                                                 
54
 All frequencies are reported on weighted data. Each country’s data was weighted to a total of 1,200 
respondents. 
Subjective Wellbeing 
Very 
High 
High Neutral Low 
Very 
Low 
Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Present wellbeing 3.4 22.8 22.1 27.7 24.0 (0.0) .66 
Past wellbeing 4.2 28.1 3.04 25.2 12.2 (0.1) .60 
Expected wellbeing 11.2 38.2 29.7 11.1 9.7 (0.0) .58 
N=21,570 
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The two items are fairly weakly correlated (Pearson’s r=.24) and unreliable (Cronbach’s 
Alpha=.38), thus calling into question whether one can use an average construct of the two. 
As with the national analysis, I chose to keep both because the Standard Trust Question was 
used in the WVS. 
 
 
 
Comparative Value Preferences, 2005/2006 
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Interpersonal Trust 
Very 
High 
High Neutral Low 
Very 
Low 
Missing 
Generalised trust - 15.7 2.1 81.5 - (4.3) 
Trust in non-coethnics 15.7 26.4 1.8 34.9 21.2 (9.1) 
N=19,154 
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Self-Expressive Preferences by Country (%), 2005/2006.  
 
Survey Item 
Afrobarometer Country (%)
55
 
BN BW CV GH KE LS MG MA ML MZ NA NG SN ZA TZ UG ZM ZW All 
Post-Modern Values 60 76 76 70 61 73 73 54 53 63 57 62 62 69 36 63 70 84 65 
Support: Freedom of Association 70 72 82 69 54 72 80 42 57 54 54 51 73 64 26 59 66 85 63 
Support: Freedom of Press 36 72 67 59 53 63 57 51 42 74 53 62 40 65 35 57 64 79 57 
Support: Freedom of Speech 74 83 80 81 77 83 81 70 60 60 64 73 74 76 47 74 82 88 74 
High Subjective Wellbeing 24 30 43 34 37 21 41 31 37 39 51 52 49 47 30 41 31 11 36 
Present conditions are at least ‘fairly good.’ 10 20 16 26 33 16 25 17 16 35 43 46 33 47 22 35 36 7 26 
Living conditions improved from 12 months ago. 25 27 29 28 32 22 30 40 30 36 49 42 47 36 31 36 56 16 32 
Expects improved conditions in 12 months. 37 44 85 48 48 25 66 35 65 46 60 69 69 59 36 51 40 9 50 
Tolerant 82 75 81 83 75 46 81 69 58 83 73 61 65 82 90 74 74 67 73 
Support: Gender Equality 79 68 80 82 69 41 79 57 55 83 79 64 57 84 89 68 76 - 71 
Support: Equal Opportunity for Office 85 83 82 84 81 51 83 81 62 84 67 59 72 81 81 79 71 67 76 
Political Activist 25 31 28 31 35 36 24 29 25 29 26 26 29 25 34 38 29 - 29 
Has/would get together with others to raise issue. 88 91 89 89 93 32 31 34 64 91 73 77 80 75 87 94 90 82 85 
Contact: Local government councilor. 21 26 16 14 35 28 18 18 30 9 17 19 25 23 29 62 20 - 24 
Contact: Member of Parliament. 6 12 9 16 16 16 5 12 9 8 9 8 11 5 17 13 12 - 11 
Contact: Government official. 4 13 9 13 18 23 1 9 4 15 16 11 11 6 17 14 10 - 11 
Contact: Political party official. 8 12 16 22 14 23 7 14 17 22 15 16 19 14 19 10 15 - 15 
Interpersonal Trust 22 10 3 16 9 13 18 22 24 26 19 9 35 12 17 15 9 - 16 
Most people can be trusted. 27 6 3 15 10 17 33 7 23 22 27 12 26 15 12 17 10 - 17 
Trusts [nationality] from other ethnic groups. 30 35 - 42 31 37 33 55 54 55 40 30 72 36 67 41 34 43 17 
SELF-EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES
56
 44 47 46 49 46 41 50 43 42 50 48 45 51 50 46 49 45 - 46 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005/2006) 
                                                 
55
 Country names: BN=Benin, BW=Botswana, CV=Cape Verde, GH=Ghana, KE=Kenya, LS=Lesotho, MG=Madagascar, MA=Malawi, ML=Mali, MZ=Mozambique, NA=Namibia, 
NG=Nigeria, SN=Senegal, ZA=South Africa, TZ=Tanzania, UG=Uganda, ZM=Zambia, and ZW=Zimbabwe. 
56
 Calculated as an average of the five aggregate indicators, to reflect that each has equal weighting. 
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Factor Analysis of the 15-Item Self-Expression Values Scale (Afrobarometer) 
 
Survey Item 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
1 2 3 4 5 
We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the 
government approves of it. 
.006 .026 -.029 .578 -.068 
The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit 
without fear of being shut down. 
.046 -.018 .024 .502 -.100 
People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of 
government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be. 
.025 -.047 -.014 .476 -.117 
Present living conditions are at least ‘fairly good.’ .011 -.083 .648 -.014 .074 
Present living conditions have improved from 12 months ago. .034 -.042 .569 -.024 .065 
Expects improved living conditions in 12 months. .008 -.047 .539 .017 .043 
In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same 
treatment as men do. 
.024 -.575 .100 .020 -.004 
Women should have the same chance of being elected to political 
office as men. 
.034 -.826 .025 .009 .005 
Has or would get together with others to raise an issue. .294 -.067 -.001 .068 .001 
Has contacted local government councillor in past year. .555 .006 .010 .018 .046 
Has contacted Member of Parliament in past year. .643 -.020 .009 -.014 .056 
Has contacted official of a government agency in past year. .639 .000 .045 -.005 .043 
Has contacted political party official in past year. .660 -.009 .032 .026 .067 
Most people can be trusted. -.002 .026 .062 -.064 .686 
Trusts Batswana from other ethnic groups. .060 -.015 .046 -.107 .360 
Eigenvalues 1.48 1.22 1.04 0.83 0.58 
Proportion of Total Variance Explained 9.9 8.2 6.9 5.6 3.8 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Direct Oblimin (oblique) with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Cross-national Comparison of Self-Expression Values Index Scores
57
 
 
Country N Mean SD Std. Error Min. Max. 
Benin  1,071  -.106 .47 .0143 -1.67 1.34 
Botswana  1,146  .010 .50 .0146 -1.73 1.32 
Cape Verde  947  -.110 .42 .0137 -1.52 1.71 
Ghana  1,069  .061 .52 .0158 -1.57 1.73 
Kenya  1,095  -.014 .52 .0157 -1.61 1.47 
Lesotho  1,136  -.226 .59 .0174 -1.92 1.71 
Madagascar  996  .141 .46 .0146 -1.47 1.37 
Malawi  1,137  -.226 .52 .0154 -1.72 1.57 
Mali  1,145  -.217 .62 .0182 -1.8 1.51 
Mozambique  911  .188 .50 .0165 -1.59 1.71 
Namibia  1,106  .021 .51 .0154 -1.72 1.53 
Nigeria  1,141  -.145 .52 .0153 -1.73 1.52 
Senegal  1,051  .134 .53 .0164 -1.38 1.61 
South Africa  1,047  .125 .53 .0163 -1.81 1.82 
Tanzania  963  .023 .45 .0145 -1.33 1.42 
Uganda  1,172  .054 .54 .0157 -1.67 1.89 
Zambia  1,117  -.027 .53 .0158 -1.92 1.75 
Zimbabwe  1,168  -.143 .33 .0097 -1.34 0.62 
Total  19,418  -.025 .50 .0153 -1.92 1.89 
  
                                                 
57
 Cape Verde score was calculated using the ‘Standard Trust Question’ to represent interpersonal trust. Zimbabwe score 
was calculated by employing the Afrobarometer mean for all survey items excluded from the country’s questionnaire. 
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Predictor Variables 
 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=2.02), which explains 40.5% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.77) is acceptable for an index of economic 
security. 
 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.06), which explains 35.5% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.57) is acceptable for a second-order index. 
 
Existential Security 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low None Missing 
Factor 
Loading 
Economic Security 43.1 13.9 19.4 15.2 8.2 (0.0) .99 
Physical Security 74.6 13.3 6.8 3.4 2.0 (0.1) .13 
Employment Security - 21.8 12.9 35.0 30.3 (0.3) .18 
N=19,913 
Factor analysis was specified to extract one factor (Eigenvalue=1.05), which explains 34.8% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.23) is not acceptable for a second-order 
index of existential security. 
 
Cognitive Engagement High Moderate Low Very Low Missing 
Political Interest 38.1 29.2 17.3 15.4 (1.2) 
Political Discussion - 23.2 45.5 31.3 (1.2) 
N=21,140 
The two items are correlated (Pearson’s r=.47) and reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha=.61) enough to 
warrant an average construct of cognitive engagement. 
 
Media Consumption 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very Low Missing 
Factor 
Loading 
Radio news 56.0 21.8 7.3 4.0 11.0 (0.2) .44 
Television news 26.4 12.6 7.3 6.8 46.8 (0.7) .80 
Newspaper news 10.2 12.7 10.6 9.7 56.9 (1.4) .67 
N=21,261 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=1.27), which explains 42.2% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.66) is acceptable for an index of media 
consumption. 
 
Cognitive Autonomy 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low Very Low Missing 
Factor 
Loading 
Formal Education - 8.7 32.7 37.3 21.3 (0.4) .53 
Cognitive Engagement - 19.0 26.2 27.0 23.4 (0.0) .17 
Media Consumption 30.9 15.7 8.4 6.8 38.2 (0.2) .79 
N=21,409 
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue=0.93), which explains 30.1% of the 
common variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.46) is acceptable for a second-order index of 
cognitive development. 
Economic Security 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low None Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
Access: Enough Food 46.5 15.5 19.8 13.5 4.7 (0.2) .65 
Access: Clean Water 50.7 12.0 15.8 12.5 8.9 (0.2) .56 
Access: Medical Care 42.1 15.4 21.2 14.5 6.8 (0.5) .73 
Access: Cooking Fuel 56.3 14.2 15.7 9.1 4.7 (0.5) .57 
Access: Cash Income 20.0 12.5 24.7 26.6 16.1 (0.6) .66 
N=21,236 
Physical Security 
Very 
High 
High Moderate Low None Missing 
Factor 
Loadings 
No Fear of Crime 65.6 13.4 10.8 5.8 4.5 (5.8) .51 
No Theft 70.5 18.4 7.1 3.2 0.8 (5.7) .73 
No Physical Assault 87.7 8.1 2.4 1.2 0.6 (5.7) .52 
N=20,311 
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Political 
Learning 
Pre-Transition Post-Transition Missing 
Political Cohort 61.9 38.1 (0.0) 
N=21,596 
 
 
Traditional Norms Yes No Missing 
More/Only Attached to Ethnic Identity 13.7 86.3 (1.1) 
Supports Clientelism 27.0 73.0 (7.0) 
N=20,092 
The two items are very weakly correlated (Pearson’s r=.03) and are not reliable (Cronbach’s 
Alpha=.06) enough to warrant an average construct of traditional norms. 
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Predictor Variables by Country, 2005/2006. 
 
Survey Item 
Afrobarometer Country (%)
58
 
BN BW CV GH KE LS MG MA ML MZ NA NG SN ZA TZ UG ZM ZW All 
‘White-Collar’ Occupation 23 39 32 22 32 22 17 23 23 23 47 50 34 39 12 31 40 24 29 
Urban residential location 42 43 47 47 19 33 16 14 27 43 40 49 41 58 23 12 37 32 35 
Economic Security 53 71 69 70 54 53 56 46 59 47 65 60 47 74 56 50 54 41 57 
Access: Enough Food 65 68 83 79 63 63 45 40 66 53 68 66 61 77 62 57 64 36 62 
Access: Clean Water 50 78 71 73 61 57 78 60 66 52 72 61 59 76 47 62 52 55 63 
Access: Medical Care 55 79 72 71 53 51 62 51 63 47 69 64 42 73 58 45 56 25 58 
Access: Cooking Fuel 73 75 72 83 67 67 72 63 70 65 76 63 55 79 81 66 71 70 70 
Access: Cash Income 20 55 49 44 24 28 24 18 32 20 42 48 19 65 29 19 28 20 32 
Physical Security 87 89 91 88 80 86 89 94 93 89 86 89 85 85 90 87 86 - 88 
No Fear of Crime 77 83 81 82 61 67 77 90 88 82 83 84 87 69 78 80 73 - 79 
No Theft 87 89 95 89 86 93 93 93 92 89 84 90 76 90 92 85 88 - 89 
No Physical Assault 98 96 98 94 92 99 98 99 100 95 90 93 92 95 98 94 98 - 96 
Currently Employed 75 26 30 60 40 14 51 9 16 22 45 46 25 38 32 53 27 22 37 
At least Secondary Education 22 55 36 41 46 28 38 21 10 23 68 65 29 73 15 42 68 64 41 
Cognitive Engagement 42 49 34 51 46 51 31 49 45 48 49 40 54 40 60 51 35 39 45 
At least ‘somewhat’ interested in politics 62 74 51 72 67 82 50 75 69 69 78 60 72 62 82 74 56 57 67 
Discusses politics frequently 22 23 18 30 24 20 12 23 21 26 19 21 37 19 39 29 15 20 23 
Media Consumption 36 56 51 51 51 24 34 35 45 36 65 56 59 75 40 36 48 39 47 
Radio news at least a few times/week 78 76 72 85 86 53 63 79 81 70 94 81 88 91 78 83 81 59 78 
Television news at least a few times/week 25 43 66 46 36 11 27 11 47 25 53 59 67 79 19 9 40 37 39 
Newspaper at least a few times/week 5 48 14 20 32 9 12 15 6 14 48 27 23 54 22 16 24 20 23 
Post-Transition Cohort 40 84 43 30 40 31 31 40 25 35 57 26 67 33 40 0 52 12 38 
Traditional Norms 22 55 36 41 46 28 38 21 10 23 68 65 29 73 15 42 68 39 34 
Feels more/only attached to ethnic ID 42 49 34 51 46 51 31 49 45 48 49 40 54 40 60 51 35 39 45 
Leaders obliged to help own community. 37 13 51 32 18 14 25 8 38 41 31 40 18 22 17 32 28 - 27 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005/2006) 
 
 
                                                 
58
 Country names: BN=Benin, BW=Botswana, CV=Cape Verde, GH=Ghana, KE=Kenya, LS=Lesotho, MG=Madagascar, MA=Malawi, ML=Mali, MZ=Mozambique, NA=Namibia, 
NG=Nigeria, SN=Senegal, ZA=South Africa, TZ=Tanzania, UG=Uganda, ZM=Zambia, and ZW=Zimbabwe. 
